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This Article provides the first comprehensive account of non-Voting Rights Act
federal voting laws. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act—long the most effective
voting rights law in American history—was disabled by the Supreme Court in
Shelby County v. Holder. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is in the
crosshairs. As the Supreme Court becomes more hostile to race-based antidis-
crimination laws like the Voting Rights Act, Congress will turn to race-neutral,
election administration-based reforms to strengthen the right to vote. Indeed,
many proposals for reform post-Shelby County have taken this form. The
federal laws this Article examines—the National Voter Registration Act of
1993 (NVRA), the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act
(UOCAVA), and the Help America Vote Act (HAVA)—regulate major aspects
of the elections process: voter registration, absentee ballots, voting machine
technology, and accessibility for disabled persons. These statutes, and the
model of regulation they illustrate, both represent the future of federal election
law and present previously unstudied challenges with implications for election
law broadly.
Federal legislation that seeks to regulate and standardize elections implicates
complicated relationships among federal, state, and local governments. This
domain of “election law federalism” has two distinct features: (1) unusually
expansive federal power to legislate pursuant to the Elections Clause; and (2)
widespread state prerogative to delegate election responsibilities to local gov-
ernment. Because of these unusual characteristics, federal election laws of the
kind this Article discusses run in perceived tension with traditional federalism
doctrines like the anticommandeering principle and state authority to organ-
ize its own subdivisions. That tension has created enforcement difficulties and
widespread noncompliance with the statutes. This Article proposes reforms
that would allow federal election legislation to accommodate the realities of
the elections system and more effectively optimize the roles of federal, state,
and local governments within the elections system.
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Introduction
The Supreme Court recently hobbled section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
in Shelby County v. Holder.1 Section 2—the Voting Rights Act’s other major
antidiscrimination provision—is in the crosshairs.2 This Article presents the
1. See 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2627, 2631 (2013) (striking down section 4(b) and disabling
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965). Before Shelby County, section 5 was one of the
most effective civil rights laws in United States history and certainly the most transformative
voting rights law. See Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its
Own Success?, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1710, 1710-12 (2004).
2. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Section 2 Is Dead: Long Live Section 2, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev.
PENNumbra 219, 220-21, 220 n.8 (2012) (describing passages from Supreme Court opinions
that cast doubt on section 2’s constitutionality and noting that “[n]o sophisticated student of
voting rights would be surprised if the Court were to strike down Section 2 or Section 5 as
unconstitutional within the next two to five years”); Roger Clegg & Hans A. von Spakovsky,
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first comprehensive examination of the important federal voting laws still on
the books after Shelby County.3 Perhaps because these laws have traditionally
operated in the shadow of the Voting Rights Act, little scholarly literature
evaluates how they operate within the diverse set of legal relationships impli-
cated by election law.4 These statutes present challenges with implications
for election law broadly.
Specifically, this Article investigates the National Voter Registration Act
of 1993 (NVRA),5 the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act
(UOCAVA),6 and the Help America Vote Act (HAVA)7 (collectively, the “fed-
eral election statutes”). The NVRA requires states to offer voter registration
opportunities at certain state offices.8 UOCAVA requires states to transmit
ballots to military and overseas voters in time for those voters to cast their
Legal Memorandum, “Disparate Impact” and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, The Heritage
Found., 4-9 (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/03/disparate-im
pact-and-section-2-of-the-voting-rights-act [http://perma.cc/C9FU-A4FU] (arguing that it
would be unconstitutional to read section 2 to prohibit voting practices that have a disparate
impact on minority groups, and that section 2 should be read only to prohibit voting practices
with disparate treatment).
3. A number of articles discuss these statutes individually, mostly in the context of the
substantive policies they regulate. They do not discuss the laws collectively or in the broader
context of the federal system. See, e.g., Steven F. Huefner, Lessons from Improvements in Mili-
tary and Overseas Voting, 47 U. Rich. L. Rev. 833 (2013) (describing different kinds of accom-
modations available to military and overseas voters pursuant to UOCAVA litigation); Daniel P.
Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1711
(2005) (linking HAVA’s election administration principles to equality norms for voting rights);
Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and Election Reform, 17 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 453
(2008) (discussing the NVRA and HAVA as they relate to voter registration and proposing
reforms intended to expand registration); Kevin K. Green, Note, A Vote Properly Cast? The
Constitutionality of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 22 J. Legis. 45 (1996) (describ-
ing some of the early constitutional challenges to the NVRA). The few pieces that have ex-
amined these statutes collectively have done so in very different contexts. See Richard L. Hasen,
The Democracy Canon, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 69 (2009) (discussing and defending a “Democracy
Canon” that reinforces the right to vote in the context of statutory interpretation); Daniel P.
Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 44
Ind. L. Rev. 113 (2010) [hereinafter Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action] (advo-
cating for more robust private rights of action for election laws).
4. Recent articles that engage with federalism and election law have done so in the
context of power struggles between the federal government and states, but have overlooked the
important role of local governments in the elections process and in the federalist structure. See,
e.g., Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting Rights
Act, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1195 (2012) (arguing that the concept of state sovereignty is irrelevant to
the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act because the Elections Clause demonstrates that
states have no true sovereignty in the context of elections).
5. National Voter Registration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg (2012) (recodified at 52
U.S.C. §§ 20501-20511).
6. Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1963ff-1973ff-7
(recodified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301-20311).
7. Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301-15545 (recodified at 52 U.S.C.
§§ 20901-21145).
8. See infra Section I.A.1.
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ballots.9 HAVA requires states to adopt voting machine technology and en-
sure accessibility.10 Each statute holds states responsible for ensuring that
their elections meet conditions the federal government believes to be neces-
sary for a fair electoral process.
These three statutes differ in character from the Voting Rights Act in
two important ways. First, they take a race-neutral approach. Whereas the
Voting Rights Act prohibits vote discrimination on the basis of race or
color,11 the federal election statutes create universal civil rights in the context
of election administration. That is, they create a series of election-related
responsibilities for states that are designed to facilitate a fair elections pro-
cess. Those obligations attach regardless of the race or color of the voter.
Despite their race-neutral approach, however, the statutes can affect the role
of race and class in elections. Voter registration rates, for example, vary
widely by race and income;12 the NVRA can play a role in remedying those
inequalities by easing access to voter registration. Since Shelby County, a
number of commentators have suggested that as the Supreme Court be-
comes more and more hostile to antidiscrimination legislation and affirma-
tive action programs,13 the federal election statutes may provide a model for
fortifying the right to vote in a manner palatable to the Court.14
9. See infra Section I.A.2.
10. See infra Section I.A.3.
11. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)) (section 2 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act, prohibiting “denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color”).
12. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that as of 2008, while 72% of white citizen adults
and 70% of black citizen adults were registered to vote, only 59% of Hispanic citizen adults
were registered; similarly, while 86% of those earning $150,000 or more per year were regis-
tered, only 62% of those making less than $10,000 per year were registered. U.S. Census
Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2008 (2008), http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/p20/2008/tables.html [http://perma.
cc/9RQN-LY3Q]; see also Registering Millions: Celebrating the Success and Potential of the Na-
tional Voter Registration Act at 20, Dçmos, http://www.demos.org/registering-millions-success-
and-potential-national-voter-registration-act-20 [http://perma.cc/DP6W-FFFB] (noting that
America suffers “from wide gaps in voter registration by both race and class”).
13. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (striking down section 4(b)
and disabling section 5 of the Voting Rights Act); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct.
2411 (2013) (exhibiting hostility toward the University of Texas’s affirmative action scheme).
See generally Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 755-73 (2011)
(describing the Court’s recent hostility to traditional civil rights laws in a number of contexts).
14. For a discussion of moving from an antidiscrimination model to an administration-
based model in election law, see generally Richard H. Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy:
From Anti-Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 How. L.J. 741 (2006) (advocating transition-
ing away from the antidiscrimination model of the Voting Rights Act toward the more univer-
sal, “right-to-vote” approach adopted by HAVA and the NVRA); Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding
to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 71, 73 (2014) (proposing
facially race-neutral compromise legislation to both expand voter registration opportunities
and require voter identification for federal elections). For a discussion of universalist ap-
proaches to civil rights generally, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with
Notes on Voting Rights After Shelby), 123 Yale L.J. 2838 (2014).
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Second, the enforcement mechanisms of the federal election statutes dif-
fer from that of the Voting Rights Act, which imposes liability directly on
jurisdictions for their own discriminatory actions.15 By contrast, the federal
election statutes hold states liable for noncompliance even though local gov-
ernments, and not states themselves, assume most election administration
responsibilities. This enforcement mechanism is reasonable: it would be
nearly impossible for the federal government to enforce these statutes
against the thousands of counties and municipalities that actually administer
elections.16 But it also creates a liability mismatch that is reflected in both
state briefing and court decisions pursuant to these statutes. States regularly
argue that (1) counties, not states, are the proper defendants in these suits;
and (2) states discharge whatever statutory responsibilities they retain
through some oversight of local government.17 Courts have largely rejected
the idea that states may evade liability by delegating responsibility to coun-
ties,18 but questions exist as to whether and how the federal government may
force states to enforce the statutes against their own local governments, espe-
cially when no cause of action exists under state law.19 To this day, states
continue to argue that their decentralized systems of election administration
exempt them from complying with the statutes and instead shift that burden
to local governments.20 This belief may help explain the widespread non-
compliance with these statutes.21 At the very least, the mismatch creates a
roadblock to effective enforcement of the statutes.
This Article argues that these state arguments, doctrinal murkiness, and
widespread noncompliance persist because the relationships implicated by
the election administration statutes are not well-understood and exist in
15. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, for example, prohibits any voting qualification or
prerequisite that discriminates on the basis of race or color, no matter the jurisdiction. See 42
U.S.C. § 1973(a) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). This is true of other prominent civil
rights statutes as well. See, e.g., Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (prohibiting housing
discrimination by placing liability directly on housing providers like landlords and real estate
companies).
16. See Brief for the United States as Appellant at 36, United States v. Missouri, 535 F.3d
844, 850 (8th Cir. 2008) (No. 07-2322), 2007 WL 6603868 (arguing that “[f]orcing the United
States to proceed locality-by-locality in enforcing the NVRA’s list-maintenance requirements
would severely strain the federal government’s resources and inevitably leave many NVRA
violations unremedied”).
17. See infra Section I.B.
18. E.g., Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding the Ohio secre-
tary of state responsible for “implementation and enforcement” of the NVRA); United States
v. New York, 255 F. Supp. 2d 73, 79 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“It would be plainly unreasonable to
permit a mandatorily designated State agency to shed its NVRA responsibilities because it has
chosen to delegate the rendering of its services to local municipal agencies.”).
19. See, e.g., Missouri, 535 F.3d at 849-51 (holding that “Missouri cannot be required to
enforce the NVRA against” local election authorities).
20. See infra Section I.B.
21. For a discussion of the widespread noncompliance with these statutes, see Presiden-
tial Comm’n on Election Admin., The American Voting Experience 15–18 (2014) [here-
inafter American Voting Experience], https://www.supportthevoter.gov/files/2014/01/
Amer-Voting-Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf [http://perma.cc/5A4A-CZ23].
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perceived tension with other well-developed legal doctrines. For example,
the statutes affect state sovereignty in ways that have not been explained by
courts, litigants, or Congress. The statutes require states to organize their
subdivisions to either effectively oversee certain kinds of election adminis-
tration or administer elections themselves.22 The statutes require this poten-
tial rearrangement even though organizing and delegating power to political
subdivisions has long been understood as the very essence of state sover-
eignty.23 Furthermore, the statutes require state actors to regulate local gov-
ernments and elections in ways that state law might not ordinarily permit.24
That mandate runs up uncomfortably against anticommandeering princi-
ples,25 even if it does not violate them, and engages a doctrinal area that
remains underdeveloped.26
Elections are themselves “hyperfederalized”; that is, many key election
decisions are made at the local level.27 The Constitution initiates decentrali-
zation by placing the primary responsibility for holding elections with
states.28 States have further decentralized election administration by delegat-
ing most election administration responsibilities to local governments.29
Moreover, each state’s election laws are different; states apportion election
administration responsibility between state officials and local governments
22. See infra Sections I.A.1–3.
23. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178–79 (1907) (“The number, nature,
and duration of the powers conferred upon [municipal corporations] . . . rests in the absolute
discretion of the state.”); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy:
Federalism for a Third Century, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 41 (1988) (“The guarantee clause . . .
restricts the federal government’s power to interfere with the organizational structure and
governmental processes chosen by a state’s residents.”).
24. See infra notes 147–172 and accompanying text.
25. The federal government “may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (quoting New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)).
26. See Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 Yale L.J. 1996, 2037–38 (2014)
(noting as an open question “whether Congress can give state actors powers that they do not
have under their own state laws”); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 663, 677 (2001) (“Relying on federal law to justify
action not authorized under state law . . . certainly implicates the integrity of state
sovereignty.”).
27. Alec C. Ewald, The Way We Vote: The Local Dimension of American Suf-
frage 3 (2009).
28. See U.S. Const. art. 1, § 4 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but
the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
chusing Senators” (emphasis added)). For background information on periods when federal
intervention has waxed and waned throughout U.S. history, see Daniel P. Tokaji, The Birth and
Rebirth of Election Administration, 6 Election L.J. 118, 122–23 (2007) (reviewing Roy G.
Saltman, The History and Politics of Voting Technology: In Quest of Integrity and
Public Confidence (2006)).
29. See Heather K. Gerken, The Democracy Index: Why Our Election System Is
Failing and How to Fix It 20–25 (2009) (“States run all of our elections, and most vest
considerable authority in localities to carry out basic tasks like registering voters and counting
ballots.”).
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in different ways.30 Elections are therefore hyperfederalized not only because
states push election decisions down to the local level, but because the quality
of decentralization, including legal relationships between counties and states,
varies by state. As a result, the federal election statutes implicate an unusual
number of federalism relationships through all three levels of government.31
I call the federal-state-local relationships implicated by the statutes
“election law federalism.”32 Election law federalism is defined by two distinct
features—expansive federal power to regulate and widespread state preroga-
tive to delegate—that both partly explain the widespread noncompliance
with the federal election statutes and raise unusual federalism and policy
questions for election law.33 This Article argues that the right question to ask
when seeking to enact and enforce federal laws within the context of election
law federalism is how to achieve the best blend of federal, state, and local
involvement. It proposes a framework for optimizing that blend.
This analysis not only helps us better understand the three statutes in
question, but also any future election law that holds states liable for election
administration responsibilities. For example, Congress could require states
to institute standardized training requirements for poll workers.34 Since
most states delegate poll worker training to local governments,35 that law
would implicate the same relationships and challenges implicated by the fed-
eral election statutes. The election law federalism model provides a helpful
framework for understanding the legal and practical relationships at issue.
Part I describes the federal election statutes, noncompliance problems
with the statutes, and the prominence of the statutes post-section 5. It then
30. See Note, Toward A Greater State Role in Election Administration, 118 Harv. L. Rev.
2314, 2323–27 (2005).
31. The Supreme Court recently issued an NVRA case that touched on some of these
relationships. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013) (holding
that the NVRA preempted an Arizona law requiring proof of citizenship to register to vote).
32. This term was used once before, in a brief case summary of a redistricting case. The
case summary mentions the term only in the title, and contains no discussion of what it might
mean. Jonathan H. Steinberg & Aimee Dudovitz, Branch v. Smith—Election Law Federalism
After Bush v. Gore: Are State Courts Unconstitutional Interlopers in Congressional Redistricting?,
2 Election L.J. 91, 91 (2003).
The term “election law federalism” follows a number of other studies about federalism as
it relates to specific policy areas. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism
Seriously, 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 57, 66; Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in
the Age of Terror, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 289 (2012).
33. Courts and scholars have discussed federalism and voting rights before—particularly
in the context of the “federalism costs” of the Voting Rights Act. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles &
Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Race, Federalism, and Voting Rights 1–2 (2015) (listing Su-
preme Court cases mentioning these costs), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=2611795 [https://perma.cc/TY4L-WHD9]. Here, I mean something different: not
the costs to state sovereignty of the federal election statutes, but rather the set of federal-state-
local relationships implicated by the statutes and the balance of power—both formal and func-
tional—inherent in those relationships.
34. For an example of what a proposal to regulate poll worker training might look like,
see American Voting Experience, supra note 21, at 47.
35. See infra notes 242–244 and accompanying text.
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describes the federal enforcement actions against states for violating the stat-
utes and the context of state-local conflict from which those actions arise.
The actions illustrate both the complex federal-state-local relationships im-
plicated by the statutes and the difficulty regulating elections in a world
where multiple sovereigns can claim responsibility for elections. Part II de-
fines election law federalism and situates it within a broader set of federal-
ism relationships implicated by other policy areas. Part III evaluates the
promise and pitfalls of administration-based election laws like the federal
election statutes and suggests a set of reforms to these laws that both account
for and accommodate the reality of a highly decentralized and diverse sys-
tem of election administration, and promote the most productive blend of
federal, state, and local involvement. Specifically, Part III suggests that these
statutes should (1) promote federal oversight of the entire compliance pro-
cess; (2) promote state management of the decentralized compliance process
specific to that state; and (3) promote local tailoring of the statutes to local
communities. The Article concludes by suggesting that the pragmatic model
illustrated by election law federalism may have broader application to policy
areas beyond election law.
I. The Pathology of Multiple Sovereigns in Election Law
Every level and branch of government plays a role in regulating elections
in the United States.36 The Elections Clause of the Constitution envisions a
structure for administering elections where states choose the “Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections.”37 Alexander Hamilton, writing in the
Federalist, believed that the Elections Clause places primary responsibility
for elections with the states and authorizes the federal government to regu-
late elections “in the last resort.”38
Because state law forms the foundation of election regulation, great va-
riety exists in how elections are administered across state lines. Voting hours
differ; funding schemes differ; absentee voting rules differ; voter registration
rules differ.39 In addition, most states delegate the nuts and bolts of election
administration to local governments. This delegation creates variety not only
among states, but also within states.40
36. Daniel Tokaji and his colleagues have used the metaphor of an “ecosystem” to de-
scribe the many inputs to election administration. Steven F. Huefner, Daniel P. Tokaji,
Edward B. Foley & Nathan A. Cemenska, From Registration to Recounts: The Elec-
tion Ecosystems of Five Midwestern States (2007), http://www.mcfn.org/pdfs/reports/Re
gistration_to_Recounts.pdf [http://perma.cc/KK85-MEUS]; Daniel P. Tokaji, Teaching Election
Administration, 56 St. Louis U. L.J. 675, 680 (2012).
37. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 4.
38. The Federalist No. 59 (Alexander Hamilton).
39. See Ewald, supra note 27, at 3–4.
40. The Constitution Project, Election Reform Briefing: Working Together?
State and Local Election Coordination (2002) [hereinafter Election Reform Brief-
ing], http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/15106 [http://perma.cc/G7BR-5RQB].
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Against this backdrop, Congress enacted a handful of laws—the NVRA,
UOCAVA, and HAVA—that seek to standardize some aspects of the elections
system nationally. Those statutes hold states liable for failing to meet various
election-related responsibilities. This Part first describes the statutes, their
widespread noncompliance, and their place in the emerging law of election
administration. It then examines litigation under the statutes and state-local
conflicts that give rise to that litigation in order to illustrate the difficulties
presented by enforcing the statutes in an ecosystem with multiple sover-
eigns41—that is, when multiple levels of government share a stake in
regulation.
A. The Statutes
1. The National Voter Registration Act of 1993
Congress enacted the NVRA, often called “motor-voter,”42 in 1993 to
increase the number of eligible citizens registered to vote.43 The statute was a
compromise between those who advocated more convenient opportunities
to register to vote (generally, Democrats) and those who wanted to prevent
vote fraud (generally, Republicans).44
The NVRA places a number of voter registration responsibilities on
states. It broadens voter registration opportunities by requiring states to of-
fer voter registration at various government offices. It requires states to treat
driver’s license applications as voter registration applications45 and to offer
voter registration opportunities at public assistance and disability services
offices.46 It seeks to increase the accuracy of voter rolls by requiring states to
remove ineligible voters from their rolls on a regular basis.47
Remedies pursuant to the NVRA include requiring states to develop
statewide voter registration procedures, institute training requirements for
state and local employees, closely monitor local government compliance
with the NVRA, and report compliance data to the plaintiff.48 The NVRA
makes states responsible for noncompliance whether or not states delegate
41. I use the term “sovereigns” loosely here to mean autonomous governmental bodies.
Whether states and local governments truly possess constitutional sovereignty in the elections
context is a question outside the scope of this Article. See infra notes 312–314 and accompany-
ing text. See generally Tolson, supra note 4 (arguing that the Elections Clause does not grant
sovereignty to states in the elections context).
42. This is because of its voter registration requirements on motor vehicle offices. See
infra note 45 and accompanying text.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(b) (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)).
44. See S. Rep. No. 103-6, at 18, 20–21 (1993).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-3 (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20504).
46. Id. § 1973gg-5(a)(2) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(2)).
47. Id. § 1973gg-6 (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20507).
48. See, e.g., Consent Decree at 6–16, United States v. Rhode Island, No. 11-113S (D.R.I.
Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/nvra/ri_nvra_cd.pdf [http://perma.cc/
7TNE-L7XB].
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voter registration responsibilities to local governments.49 Both the United
States attorney general and private parties may enforce the NVRA.50
Why the NVRA matters: Although state compliance with the NVRA has
been mixed, voter registration has increased since Congress enacted it. The
percentage of registered, voting-aged citizens increased by 11.4 percent be-
tween 1992—right before the NVRA was enacted—and 2012.51 Further-
more, robust compliance with the NVRA can have a large impact on the
number of registered voters in a state. A recent report found that especially
in large states, increasing compliance with section 5 of the NVRA, which
requires states to offer voter registration opportunities at DMV offices, could
result in registering millions of additional voters in the state.52 In California,
for example, improving NVRA compliance would result in over four million
new voter registration applications.53
2. The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act
UOCAVA, as amended in 2009 by the Military and Overseas Voter Em-
powerment Act,54 protects the voting rights of military and overseas citi-
zens.55 UOCAVA’s centerpiece requires states to transmit absentee ballots to
military and overseas voters who request a ballot no fewer than forty-five
days before an election.56 UOCAVA also seeks to make military and overseas
voting easier in various other ways. It requires states to use a postcard regis-
tration form that military and overseas voters can use as a combined regis-
tration application and application to vote absentee.57 It requires states to
49. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-3(c)(1) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20504(c)(1)) (“Each
State shall include a voter registration application form for elections for Federal office as part
of an application for a State motor vehicle driver’s license.” (emphasis added)); id. § 1973gg-
5(a)(1)) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(1)) (“Each State shall designate agencies for the
registration of voters in elections for Federal office.” (emphasis added)).
50. Id. § 1973gg-9 (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20510).
51. Royce Crocker, Cong. Research Serv., The National Voter Registration Act
of 1993: History, Implementation, and Effects 22–23 (2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R40609.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZA7B-LJZN].
52. See Stuart Naifeh, Dçmos, Driving the Vote: Are States Complying with the
Motor Voter Requirements of the National Voter Registration Act? 11–12 (2015),
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Driving%20the%20Vote_0.pdf [http://
perma.cc/TNW8-FHZR].
53. Id. at 12.
54. Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 575, 123 Stat.
2190, 2318 (2009).
55. Ira Katznelson provides a fascinating account of how federal military voting legisla-
tion first came to exist. See Ira Katznelson, Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins
of Our Time 195–222 (2013). In Katznelson’s account, some Southern states opposed mili-
tary voting legislation in part because those laws broke down racial barriers to vote (by elimi-
nating a poll tax for soldiers abroad, both black and white) and because they nationalized what
had previously been a state responsibility. See id.
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-1(a)(8) (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8)).
57. Id. § 1973ff-1(a)(4) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(4)).
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establish procedures that allow UOCAVA voters to request and track absen-
tee ballots easily; that establish a plan for states to transmit ballots to UO-
CAVA voters; and that establish a plan for states to remain in compliance
with UOCAVA during runoff elections.58 UOCAVA also requires states to
report on the number of absentee ballots transmitted to and received from
UOCAVA voters.59
Remedies pursuant to UOCAVA include requiring states to accept bal-
lots from military and overseas voters even after the normal deadline for
accepting ballots, regardless of state law; requiring states to certify that all
UOCAVA ballots have been transmitted by local governments; and even pro-
posing legislation and taking administrative action to prevent noncompli-
ance in the future.60 Like the NVRA, UOCAVA places its responsibilities on
states, regardless of which governmental body is actually responsible for
transmitting absentee ballots.61 The United States attorney general enforces
UOCAVA; whether UOCAVA also confers a private right of action is an open
question.62
Why UOCAVA matters: Military and overseas voters are vulnerable to
election administration failure. Military voters especially, who have volun-
teered to serve their country, should not be disenfranchised because state
and local governments are not able to transmit ballots with sufficient time
for those voters to vote and return their ballots in time to be counted. The
Presidential Commission on Election Administration has stated that UO-
CAVA has made “[g]reat strides . . . in facilitating voting by soldiers and
others overseas.”63 But as described below, noncompliance persists.
3. The Help America Vote Act of 2002
HAVA emerged from a national conversation that began with the diffi-
culties of the 2000 election: hanging chads, absence of a paper trail, and
unreliable and varied voting systems.64 HAVA provides federal funding for
states to update their voting machines and registration systems.65
58. Id. § 1973ff-1(a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(9), (f) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(6), (a)(7),
(a)(9), (f)).
59. Id. § 1973ff-1(a)(11) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(11)).
60. See, e.g., Consent Decree at 5–8, United States v. Illinois, No. 15CV2997 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/misc/il_uocava_cd15.pdf [http://perma.cc/
L84S-9PY3].
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-1(a) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)) (noting that “[e]ach
state shall” comply with UOCAVA’s requirements).
62. See id. § 1973ff-4(a) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20307(a)); Tokaji, Public Rights and
Private Rights of Action, supra note 3, at 142–46 (discussing whether UOCAVA confers a pri-
vate right of action).
63. American Voting Experience, supra note 21, at 15.
64. Charles Stewart III, What Hath HAVA Wrought? Consequences, Intended and Not, of
the Post-Bush v. Gore Reforms 4–17 (CalTech/MIT Voting Technology Project, Working Paper
No. 102, 2001), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1843583 [http://perma.cc/
5K5F-D78K] (describing how problems in Florida led to the passage of HAVA).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 15301 (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20901).
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Broadly, HAVA requires three things. First, HAVA imposes a number of
requirements on the voting systems used by states (that is, the hardware and
software voters use to vote).66 HAVA requires voting systems to allow the
voter to review, verify, and change her vote before casting it;67 to alert the
voter (and permit correction) if she has voted for more than one candidate
for a single office;68 to provide a written record of the vote for the purposes
of a “manual audit” (read: recount);69 and to be accessible to persons with
disabilities.70 These provisions, in conjunction with others in the statute, had
the effect of requiring states to upgrade from punch-card and lever voting
systems to optical scanner and touch-screen machine systems.71 Second,
HAVA implements rules for permitting a voter to cast a provisional ballot if
the voter’s name does not appear on the official list of eligible voters.72 Con-
gress intended this provision to prevent people from being denied their
votes on the basis of registration errors—a large problem in the 2000 elec-
tions.73 Finally, to centralize voter registration rolls, HAVA requires each
state to implement a statewide voter registration list, administered at the
state level, to serve as the state’s single system for managing the list of regis-
tered voters in the state.74 Congress left the specific methods of implement-
ing these requirements to states.75
Remedies pursuant to HAVA include requiring a state to implement a
statewide plan to update its voting systems—even when that plan puts the
state at odds with local governments—and comply with detailed reporting
requirements to keep the plaintiff updated on its progress in coming into
compliance.76 The United States attorney general has authority to enforce
HAVA; some courts have held that private parties may enforce it as well.77
66. Id. § 15481 (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 21081).
67. Id. § 15481(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 21081(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii)).
68. Id. § 15481(a)(1)(A)(iii) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 21081(a)(1)(A)(iii)).
69. Id. § 15481(a)(2) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 21081(a)(1)(A)(2)).
70. Id. § 15481(a)(3) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 21081(a)(1)(A)(3)).
71. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Hava in Court: A Summary and Analysis of Litigation, 12 Elec-
tion L.J. 203, 205 (2013). Although at least one commentator believes that HAVA may dis-
courage regular upgrades to voting systems by requiring states to buy, rather than lease,
expensive voting machines. See Brandon Fail, Comment, HAVA’s Unintended Consequences: A
Lesson for Next Time, 116 Yale L.J. 493, 494 (2006).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a)).
73. Tokaji, supra note 71, at 205.
74. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a)(1) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a)(1)).
75. Id. § 15485 (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 21085) (“The specific choices on the methods
of complying with the requirements of this subchapter shall be left to the discretion of the
State.”).
76. E.g., Proposed Remedial Order at 2–6, United States v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections,
No. 06-CV-0263 (GLS) (N.D.N.Y. June 2, 2006), http://www.wheresthepaper.org/OrderJune
2_2006.pdf [http://perma.cc/LY7X-W3GZ].
77. 42 U.S.C. § 15511 (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 21111); Tokaji, Public Rights and Private
Rights of Action, supra note 3, at 147–54 (discussing the mixed case law on whether HAVA
provides a private right of action).
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Why HAVA matters: HAVA sought to provide national standards for
election administration, and it has had some successes. It reduced the num-
ber of over- and undervotes,78 which was one of its central aims.79 Voting
machines have lost fewer votes since HAVA went into effect, and fewer voters
have been turned away from the polls because of registration problems.80
Since HAVA took effect, more polling places and voting systems are now
accessible to persons with disabilities.81 And 70 percent of local governments
have upgraded to new voting systems since 2000.82
But HAVA did not fully nationalize election administration. Commenta-
tors note that “[r]elatively autonomous county or municipal officials still
manage most election procedures in a highly decentralized fashion, consis-
tent with the American bias towards localism.”83
4. Widespread Noncompliance
Although each of the federal election statutes serves an important goal
and has the potential to greatly improve key parts of the elections system,
noncompliance with the statutes exists throughout the country. The remain-
der of this Article seeks to explain that noncompliance by examining road-
blocks to enforcement; this Subsection uses the report and
recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Elections Administra-
tion, as well as other government and private reports, to demonstrate
noncompliance.
The Presidential Commission calls the NVRA “the election statute most
often ignored.”84 In the most recent report on the impact of the NVRA from
2013–2014, produced by the U.S. Elections Assistance Commission, thirty-
eight states submitted data on the public agency sources of their new voter
registration applications.85 Of those thirty-eight, twenty-two states reported
78. An overvote occurs when a voter votes for more than the allowable number of
choices in a particular race, spoiling the ballot. An undervote occurs when the voter fails to
vote in a particular race.
79. Matthew M. Damschroder, Of Money, Machines, and Management: Election Adminis-
tration from an Administrator’s Perspective, 12 Election L.J. 195, 197 (2013).
80. See Stewart III, supra note 64, at 41 (summarizing empirical findings about the effect
of HAVA).
81. Press Release, GAO, Statement Before the National Council on Disability, Voters with
Disabilities: Challenges to Voting Accessibility 7 (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/
660/654099.pdf [http://perma.cc/3GGH-FXAJ].
82. See Joshua A. Douglas, To HAVA, and Beyond!, 12 Election L.J. 233 (2013) (review-
ing Martha Kropf & David C. Kimball, Helping America Vote: The Limits of Election
Reform (2012)).
83. David C. Kimball & Brady Baybeck, Are All Jurisdictions Equal? Size Disparity in Elec-
tion Administration, 12 Election L.J. 130, 130 (2013) (noting the “tremendous disparities in
local election administration”).
84. American Voting Experience, supra note 21, at 17.
85. U.S. Elections Assistance Comm’n, The Impact of the National Voter Regis-
tration Act of 1993 on the Administration of Elections for Federal Office
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receiving fewer than 3 percent of their total new voter registration applica-
tions from public assistance agencies,86 despite the NVRA’s requirement that
states offer voter registration applications with each application for public
assistance.87 All but four states reported receiving less than 1 percent of their
new voter registration applications from state disability services offices.88
Seventeen states reported receiving fewer than a hundred applications from
those offices.89
States do even worse complying with the provision of the NVRA that
requires them to offer voter registration opportunities at motor vehicle of-
fices. A Pew Charitable Trusts report found that states were largely unaware
of whether their motor vehicle offices complied with the NVRA.90 Another
report, authored by Dçmos, found that aside from a handful of model states,
most states “fail to make voter registration an integral part of driver’s license
services and place the burden of registering to vote or updating their voter
registrations on voters.”91
Similarly, many states struggle with UOCAVA compliance. The Presi-
dential Commission found that UOCAVA voters had difficulties registering
to vote, receiving their ballots in time to cast votes, and returning their com-
pleted ballots in time to be counted.92 Furthermore, the Commission and
other organizations have found inconsistency in how states implement UO-
CAVA.93 A Pew Charitable Trusts report from 2009 found that sixteen states
plus the District of Columbia failed to provide sufficient time for their mili-
tary and overseas voters to vote, as a matter of state law or practice.94 One
scholar notes that “some two decades after its enactment, UOCAVA still had
not solved the most critical problem facing overseas voters: the need for
more time to request, receive, vote, and return an absentee ballot before the
state deadlines.”95
2013–2014 81 (2015), http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Documents/2014%20EAC%20EAVS%20Re
port.pdf [http://perma.cc/MV7V-WYER].
86. Id.
87. See id. at 17.
88. Id. at 86.
89. Id.
90. See Pew Charitable Trusts, Measuring Motor Voter 2 (2014), http://
www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2014/05/06/MeasuringMotorVoter.pdf [http://perma.cc/
8B4Y-JDDF].
91. Naifeh, supra note 52, at 2 (2015).
92. American Voting Experience, supra note 21, at 15.
93. Id.
94. Pew Ctr. on the States, No Time to Vote: Challenges Facing America’s
Overseas Military Voters 2–3 (2009), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploaded
files/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/election_reform/NTTVReportWebpdf.pdf [http://perma.cc/57
TG-PYJS].
95. Huefner, supra note 3, at 843; see also R. Michael Alvarez et al., Military Voting and
the Law: Procedural and Technological Solutions to the Ballot Transit Problem, 34 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 935, 941–42 (2007) (describing difficulties military voters have receiving and trans-
mitting their absentee ballots in time, despite UOCAVA).
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The Department of Justice has undertaken robust enforcement efforts to
increase UOCAVA compliance. But the department’s large number of suits
against states itself demonstrates ongoing, widespread noncompliance with
the statute. Since 2000, the Department of Justice has brought twenty-eight
UOCAVA suits against nineteen separate states or territories and has
achieved a positive result in each.96 It has had to sue numerous states
twice—Georgia, Michigan, New York, Vermont, and Wisconsin—during
that time period. It has had to sue Alabama and Illinois three times.97 These
twenty-seven suits exclude any private, out-of-court settlements the depart-
ment has reached.98 That the department has had to sue seven states multi-
ple times—pursuant to the same statute and within such a short time
period—suggests that state laws may impose structural barriers to
compliance.
HAVA faces fewer compliance challenges than the NVRA and UO-
CAVA,99 but persistent noncompliance exists, particularly in ensuring that
voting systems are accessible to disabled persons. A 2013 report from the
Governmental Accountability Office found that a significant percentage of
polling places and voting systems had impediments to accessible voting.100
The Presidential Commission similarly reported that disability rights groups
noted continued inaccessibility at many polling places and stressed the need
to train poll workers to effectively assist voters with a range of accessibility
needs.101
96. E.g. Consent Decree, supra note 60; Settlement Agreement & Stipulated Motion for
Entry of Order, United States v. Vermont, No. 5:12-cv-236 (D. Vt. Oct. 22, 2012), http://
www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/misc/vt_uocava_settlement12.pdf [http://perma.cc/5FU5-
RWY8]; Consent Decree, United States v. Territory of the Virgin Islands, No. 3:12-CV-00069
(D.V.I. Sept. 7, 2012), www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/misc/vi_cd.pdf [http://perma.cc/59XJ-
2T5X]; see Cases Raising Claims Under the Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act,
U.S. Dep’t Just., http://www.justice.gov/crt/cases-raising-claims-under-uniformed-and-over-
seas-citizen-absentee-voting-act [http://perma.cc/8TUD-5YVS] (last updated Oct. 16, 2015)
(listing and describing the twenty-eight cases).
97. See U.S. Dep’t Just., supra note 96 (listing lawsuits against Alabama (three times),
California, Connecticut, Georgia (twice), Guam, Illinois (three times), Michigan (twice), New
Mexico, New York (twice), North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Tennessee, Ver-
mont (twice), Virgin Islands, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin (twice)). I discuss some of
these lawsuits below. See infra Section I.B.
98. See Recent Voting Section Settlements, U.S. Dep’t Just., http://www.justice.gov/crt/
about/vot/litigation/recent_settlements.php [http://perma.cc/EKY2-4SDD] (listing numerous
other out-of-court memoranda of understanding between the federal government and various
states).
99. Daniel Tokaji speculates that the relative dearth of lawsuits pursuant to HAVA exists
because HAVA does not require as much from states and local governments as the NVRA and
UOCAVA. See Tokaji, supra note 71, at 204–05.
100. Press Release, GAO, supra note 81, at 7–8.
101. American Voting Experience, supra note 21, at 16–17.
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5. The Rise of Administration-Based Election Laws
The Supreme Court’s recent disabling of section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act is the latest of a fairly long line of Supreme Court decisions striking
down civil rights legislation. Beginning in the 1990s, the Court has struck
down a series of antidiscrimination laws enacted pursuant to Congress’s au-
thority to enforce the Equal Protection Clause: the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act,102 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,103 pieces of the
Americans with Disabilities Act,104 and the Violence Against Women Act.105
Kenji Yoshino argues that anxiety about excessive pluralism has motivated
the Court to limit Congress’s authority to enact equal protection legislation
that seeks to protect specific minority groups.106 Instead, the Court has em-
braced a substantive due process/equal protection synthesis—or “dignitary”
claims—that continues to protect, but in a less pluralist and more universal-
ist register.107
Election law scholars have registered this trend as well. Samuel Is-
sacharoff, for example, opines that recent legislative and judicial trends “all
point to a pivot away from the inherited civil-rights approaches” in the con-
text of voting rights.108 Guy-Uriel Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer write
that Shelby County marked “an end to the racial discrimination consen-
sus.”109 In contrast with the Court’s jurisprudence on antidiscrimination
legislation, the Court has in recent years upheld legislation enacted pursuant
to the Elections Clause. Elections Clause legislation tends to be race-neutral
and administration-based. That is, it imposes conditions on elections, no
matter which voters are affected. For example, in Arizona v. Inter Tribal
Council of Arizona, Inc.,110 the Court held that the NVRA, enacted pursuant
to Congress’s Elections Clause authority, preempted an Arizona law requir-
ing proof of citizenship to register to vote.111 Arizona later attempted to cir-
cumvent the NVRA administratively through the Elections Assistance
Commission (EAC), but was thwarted when the Tenth Circuit upheld the
102. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
103. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
104. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
105. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
106. See Yoshino, supra note 13, at 793–94.
107. See id. at 791, 793–94.
108. Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 Duke L.J. 1363, 1407 (2015) (explaining that
the pivot from traditional notions of civil rights is explained by “the combination of the di-
minishing explanatory force of race as the critical motivation of the new laws, the emergence
of a constitutional jurisprudence on a nondiscrimination account of the right to vote, and the
prospect of federal regulatory power being exercised on the basis of control over federal
elections”).
109. Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The
Death of a Superstatute, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 1389, 1422 (2015).
110. 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013).
111. See infra notes 210–222 and accompanying text.
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EAC’s decision preventing Arizona from adding citizenship requirements to
the voter registration form.112 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.113
Perhaps responding to this trend, commentators have begun proposing
election law reforms that are race-neutral and administration-based rather
than race-conscious, like the federal election statutes. As early as 2006, even
before Shelby County was decided, Richard Pildes advocated transitioning
away from the antidiscrimination model of the Voting Rights Act and to-
ward the more universal, “right-to-vote” approach adopted by HAVA and
the NVRA.114 Since Shelby County, other election law scholars have suggested
administration-based replacements for section 5. Daniel Tokaji, for example,
proposes compromise legislation to both expand voter registration opportu-
nities and require voter identification for federal elections.115 That proposal
takes a facially race-neutral, administration-based approach to election
law.116 Issacharoff proposes a similarly administrative, race-neutral solution
that would require states to disclose any voting changes, but not to preclear
those changes as required under section 5.117 The recent report of the Presi-
dential Commission likewise issued a number of race-neutral, administra-
tion-based proposals for election reform, including standards for poll
worker training and procedures for determining the location of polling
places.118
While national election administration proposals that fortify the right to
vote may be popular in the academy and permitted by the judiciary, political
opposition may exist. During the debates over HAVA, a Republican House
report stated that local administration of elections carried significant bene-
fits, and that HAVA was meant to foster local administration of elections,
not supplant it.119 Specifically, the report noted that decentralized elections
prevent widespread vote fraud, allow for tailoring to local needs and circum-
stances, and improve accountability for election administration.120
112. See Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 772 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir.
2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2891 (2015).
113. Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2891 (2015).
114. Pildes, supra note 14, at 755–62; Richard H. Pildes, We Need a Broader Approach,
N.Y. Times: Room for Debate (Feb. 24, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfor
debate/2013/02/24/is-the-voting-rights-act-still-needed/we-need-a-broader-approach?page
wanted=all [http://perma.cc.7447-GCDS].
115. Tokaji, supra note 14, at 73.
116. Id. at 99–101.
117. Samuel Issacharoff, Comment, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127
Harv. L. Rev. 95, 121–22 (2013).
118. American Voting Experience, supra note 21, at 31–70. Although the commission
did not frame its recommendations in the form of proposed federal law, it provides examples
of legislation that could easily be translated into federal law.
119. H.R. Rep. No. 107-329, pt. 1, at 31–32 (2001).
120. Id. at 32.
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Nevertheless, judicial concern with antidiscrimination legislation has led
to a surge of interest in the federal election statutes.121 And yet, despite these
efforts at enforcement, noncompliance with these statutes remains wide-
spread.122 The remainder of this Part describes state and local resistance to
the federal election statutes and begins to provide an explanation for this
persistent noncompliance.
B. Federal-State Conflict
Two conditions help explain the federal government’s struggle to secure
compliance with the federal election statutes. First, each of the statutes
makes states liable for noncompliance. Second, states have delegated many
of their election administration responsibilities to local governments. These
two conditions create what I call a liability mismatch: the federal election
statutes hold states responsible for conduct that states have delegated to local
governments. States have attempted to use this mismatch—largely unsuc-
cessfully—to evade responsibility for compliance with the federal election
statutes. This Section describes the archeology of those attempts.
States have long resisted their responsibilities under the federal election
statutes, and early cases reveal some tension between the statutes and tradi-
tional federalism doctrines. In the first round of litigation under the NVRA,
for instance, Illinois challenged the constitutionality of the NVRA on the
ground that it impermissibly required the state to administer a federal pro-
gram.123 The Seventh Circuit disagreed and affirmed most of the trial court’s
order mandating compliance.124 The Seventh Circuit took issue, however,
with a provision of the trial court’s order that required Illinois (and by im-
plication, the Illinois legislature) to delegate all powers necessary to ensure
compliance with the law to a state election “czar.”125 The court found that
this requirement “failed to exhibit an adequate sensitivity to the principle of
federalism” and failed to recognize “the value of decentralized
government.”126
121. Nonprofit groups have recently redoubled their efforts to enforce the NVRA. See J.
Mijin Cha, Dçmos, Registering Millions: The Success and Potential of the National
Voter Registration Act at Twenty 9 (n.d.), http://www.demos.org/registering-millions-
success-and-potential-national-voter-registration-act-20 [http://perma.cc/W9XT-GP47] (not-
ing the importance of enforcing the NVRA); Public Agency Registration, Project Vote, http://
www.projectvote.org/public-agency-reg.html [http://perma.cc/XXA8-FM25] (noting the crea-
tion of a group devoted to enforcing the NVRA).
122. See supra Section I.A.4.
123. ACORN v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 793 (7th Cir. 1995).
124. Id. at 796–98.
125. Id. at 797–98.
126. Id. at 798.
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The Ninth Circuit also raised federalism concerns about the NVRA.
Soon after the NVRA’s enactment, California sued the United States to pre-
vent enforcement on Tenth Amendment grounds.127 The court found that
the statute fell within Congress’s Elections Clause authority.128 The court did
recognize, however, that California’s sovereignty was a “constitutional con-
cern,” and directed the district court “to impose no burdens on the state not
authorized by the Act which would impair the State of California’s retained
power to conduct its state elections as it sees fit.”129
Liability mismatch arguments gained traction in the mid-2000s with
Harkless v. Brunner130 and United States v. Missouri,131 two cases involving
state noncompliance with the NVRA. In Harkless, a private plaintiff sued
Ohio state officials for failing to provide voter registration opportunities in
public assistance offices around the state, as required by section 7 of the
NVRA.132 In Missouri, the United States sued Missouri for noncompliance
with section 8 of the NVRA, which regulates voter list management.133 In
both cases, the state argued that it could not be sued for violations of the
NVRA because (1) the state legislature delegated state election administra-
tion responsibilities to local governments; and (2) neither state law nor the
NVRA gave state officials the authority to enforce the NVRA against local
governments.134 In both cases, the district courts agreed with the states.135
Nevertheless, the courts also found both stated out of compliance with the
NVRA, in part because of state officials’ failure to act.136 In Missouri, the
district court held that because the Missouri legislature delegated NVRA
compliance to local governments, Missouri could only be liable if the NVRA
required states to adopt laws providing for direct enforcement of the NVRA
127. See Voting Rights Coal. v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1412–13, 1415 (9th Cir. 1995); see
also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Wilson v. Voting Rights Coal., 516 U.S. 1093 (1996) (No.
95-673), 1995 WL 17048226.
128. See Voting Rights Coal., 60 F.3d at 1415 (“Congress may conscript state agencies to
carry out voter registration for the election of Representatives and Senators.”).
129. Id. at 1415–16; see also id. at 1416 (“We foresee the possibility in which the district
court will be asked to determine whether a certain implementation of the statute sought by the
United States, which is helpful but not essential to its interests, is properly resisted by the state
on substantial grounds related to its sovereignty.”).
130. 545 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2008).
131. 535 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 2008).
132. Harkless, 545 F.3d at 446–47.
133. Missouri, 535 F.3d at 846.
134. See Harkless v. Blackwell, 467 F. Supp. 2d 754, 762–64 (N.D. Ohio 2006), rev’d sub
nom. Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Missouri, No. 05-
4391-CV-C-NKL, 2006 WL 1446356, at *6–7 (W.D. Mo. May 23, 2006), rev’d, 535 F.3d 844
(8th Cir. 2008).
135. See Harkless, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 764 (“[B]ecause Ohio has passed laws . . . that clearly
impose the duties at issue here upon the local [public assistance] offices, the Secretary of State
cannot be held liable for the failings of these agencies, and because Blackwell has fulfilled his
responsibilities under the NVRA and Ohio law, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim against
him.”); Missouri, 2006 WL 1446356, at *6–9.
136. See Harkless, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 757; Missouri, 2006 WL 1446356, at *4–5.
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by state officials.137 That conclusion would “alter the longstanding division
of authority between county and statewide officials,” and the court held that
it would be “radical” for the court to find that intent in the law.138
Both courts of appeals reversed, but on different grounds. In Harkless,
the court rejected the state’s interpretation of the NVRA that would permit
the state to avoid liability by delegating its responsibilities to local govern-
ments: “if every state passed legislation delegating NVRA responsibilities to
local authorities, the fifty states would be completely insulated from any en-
forcement burdens, even if NVRA violations occurred throughout the
state.”139 The court held that the better reading of the statute is to require
states—even ones that delegate some NVRA responsibilities—to ensure that
voter registration agencies comply with the NVRA’s requirements.140
The Missouri court took a subtler approach. It tied the state’s obliga-
tions to the NVRA’s text, noting that “[s]ome of these provisions envision
delegation, and do not require the states to do more than delegate.”141 The
court nonetheless reversed and found that local noncompliance bore on
whether Missouri failed to oversee compliance with the NVRA.142 The court
of appeals agreed with the district court, however, that Missouri could not
be required to enforce the NVRA against its local election officials.143
Importantly, the Missouri court rejected the United States’ “policy” ar-
gument that it would be more difficult for the federal government to enforce
the NVRA against local governments than it would be for the state to en-
force the law.144 The court “decline[d] to shift this cost and burden to the
states without clear direction from Congress.”145 Although the district court
could not force Missouri to enforce the NVRA against local officials, the
district court could order Missouri to employ better means of encouraging
local governments to comply with the NVRA, or simply assume direct re-
sponsibility for NVRA compliance itself.146
The constitutional concerns noted by the Ninth and Seventh Circuits in
the preliminary round of legal challenges to the NVRA—subtle as they may
seem—and the murkiness of the Missouri decision provided the language
that states have used to resist complying with the federal election statutes.
137. Missouri, 2006 WL 1446356, at *2, *7 (“The only basis for finding that Missouri is
responsible for the conduct of the local election authorities rests on the theory that Congress
intended the states to adopt statutes that both incorporated the terms of the NVRA and pro-
vided for direct enforcement of those state statutes by statewide officials.”).
138. Id.
139. Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 2008). The court even speculated
that if county election officials were joined as defendants, they might throw responsibility for
compliance back on the state. Id. at 452 n.3.
140. Id. at 452.
141. United States v. Missouri, 535 F.3d 844, 849 (8th Cir. 2008).
142. Id. at 851.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 851 n.3.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 851.
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These arguments play a game of liability hot potato, and they span litigation
over all three of the federal election statutes discussed in this Article. States
have resisted their obligations in different ways, but a persistent theme
sounds among their filings: states claim that they are not the proper defend-
ants in these lawsuits, or that they are powerless under state law to comply
with the statutes even if they wanted to.
New York officials, for example, have played liability hot potato a num-
ber of times. In 2003, the United States sued the New York State Office of
Temporary and Disability Assistance and the New York State Office for the
Aging for failing to provide voter registration opportunities as required by
the NVRA.147 The New York agencies argued that they could not be liable for
violations of the NVRA because local governments—and not state offi-
cials—administered the agency offices where the violation took place.148 The
court disagreed. Although “the NVRA does not explicitly require that state
agencies ensure NVRA compliance by county or city-run district offices,”
the court noted, “[i]t would be plainly unreasonable to permit a
mandatorily designated State agency to shed its NVRA responsibilities be-
cause it has chosen to delegate the rendering of its services to local munici-
pal agencies.”149
New York made a variation of this same argument to evade liability
under the NVRA in a separate suit in 2009. The United States sued New
York for violating the NVRA by failing to provide voter registration oppor-
tunities in disabled student services offices of state-funded colleges and lo-
cally operated community colleges and for failing to designate those offices
as voter registration agencies.150 Twice (once in a motion to dismiss and
once in a motion for summary judgment), New York attempted to evade
responsibility for the NVRA through arguments grounded in state law. First,
New York argued it lacked sole responsibility for compliance and the case
should be dismissed because the United States did not also sue the commu-
nity colleges themselves, which were separate entities under state law.151 New
York also argued that only the New York Legislature, and not New York state
147. United States v. New York, 255 F. Supp. 2d 73 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
148. Id. at 78.
149. Id. at 79.
150. United States v. New York, 700 F. Supp. 2d 186 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
151. See Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 13–20, New York, 700 F.
Supp. 2d at 187 (No. 5:04-CV-0428 (NAM)(DEP)); Memorandum of Law in Support of De-
fendants’ Motion to Dismiss Claims Against Indispensable Parties or Add Necessary Parties
and Drop Improper Parties from this Action at 17–24, United States v. New York, 2007 WL
951576 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007) (No. 04-CV-428 NAM/DEP). New York distinguished the
community colleges from the public assistance offices in the previous suit on the ground that
public assistance offices are administered on a statewide basis. See id. at 5.
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officials, had authority to designate voter registration agencies pursuant to
state law.152 The court rejected both arguments.153
Alabama has also made this argument multiple times in litigation. The
United States sued Alabama for failing to comply with UOCAVA in 2012.
Alabama argued that it was not the correct defendant in the case because
local officials—and not state officials—were responsible for transmitting ab-
sentee ballots. The state argued that Congress did not intend “to cast aside
general principles of legal liability or to intrude upon the State’s sovereign
prerogative to organize its internal affairs, i.e., which officials have which
duties and to whom they report, as it sees fit.”154 Later in the litigation,
Alabama described to the court its difficulties enforcing UOCAVA given the
independent role of local election officials in administering elections:
Most local election officials are cooperative and diligent. In some
cases, though, local officials will not cooperate with the Secretary of State.
For example, the AEM [Absentee Election Manager] of Jefferson County,
Alabama, when it was clear that the county would miss the deadline, re-
fused to allow state officials to assist in ballot transmission in 2010, even
though state officials drove from Montgomery to Birmingham twice to of-
fer their help. . . . If a local official refuses to cooperate or provide informa-
tion to the Secretary of State, the Secretary has no authority to compel the
action of a local official. The situation is often resolved through persuasion,
but the fact remains that the Secretary cannot be in 67 counties at once,
and cannot compel a local official to mail a ballot by a particular date.
The Secretary of State cannot fire an elected Probate Judge, or an
[AEM]. Circuit Clerks, who are elected by voters in a county, normally
serve as the AEM, but where they decline to serve or are precluded from
serving, their replacement is appointed by county appointing boards. . . .
While Circuit Clerks performing regular duties are paid by the State, they
are compensated by the county for duties performed as AEM . . . .
So while the Defendants can inform and train local election officials –
and always want to look for ways to improve in doing so – the Defendants
cannot perform the duties of local election officials. Defendants cannot
force them to fulfill their duties on a timely basis, or fire them if they do
152. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Claims
Against Indispensable Parties or Add Necessary Parties and Drop Improper Parties from this
Action, supra note 151, at 8–9 (“As much as the U.S. may prefer another arrangement whereby
the Governor or the Chief Election officer of the State would have the power to unilaterally
alter the system of voter registration in New York State, there is no elections czar in New York
State who may unilaterally decree what state agencies will be voter registration agencies under
the NVRA.”).
153. New York, 2007 WL 951576, at *4–5.
154. State Defendants’ Third Response to the Court’s Opinion and Order and Motion to
Dissolve Injunction at 3 n.1, United States v. Alabama, 857 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (M.D. Ala. 2012)
(No. 2:12-cv-00179-MHT-WC); see also id. (“Accordingly, while it is undisputed that UO-
CAVA ballots requested in advance of January 28, 2012 were not transmitted by that same date,
it does not necessarily follow that the correct defendants are before this Court such that any
relief can issue.”).
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not. A lawsuit (such as a mandamus action) requiring a local election offi-
cial to fulfill their duties in election matters will not help with UOCAVA
compliance if a local official has already missed a deadline.155
The court disagreed with Alabama and noted the “explicit” statutory lan-
guage that “[e]ach State” shall transmit ballots to military and overseas vot-
ers in order to comply with UOCAVA.156 But Alabama’s description of
conflicts with local election officials demonstrates the kind of barriers that
state election law can place on compliance with the federal election statutes.
Alabama’s argument echoes a debate between the state and its counties
over election administration that took place in the mid-2000s, when Ala-
bama needed to come into compliance with HAVA by updating its voting
machines. In 2005, the Alabama attorney general issued an opinion stating
that the Alabama secretary of state did not have the authority to select a
particular voting system or designate a set of acceptable systems for Alabama
counties in order to comply with HAVA.157 Nor did the secretary of state,
according to the opinion, have the authority to prevent the counties from
purchasing certain systems.158 When Alabama proposed a new law that
would permit the secretary of state to select the available voting machines
for the counties, county officials objected to surrendering the authority that
they had long possessed.159 Alabama did ultimately enact that legislation,
and brought the state into compliance with HAVA.160 The Alabama attorney
general opinion demonstrates Alabama’s genuine belief that it lacked the
ability to comply with HAVA until it enacted implementing legislation—that
is, a belief that HAVA itself did not give Alabama sufficient authority to
comply with its terms.
California and Vermont have also expressed the belief that their state
officials lack power to enforce the federal election statutes against local gov-
ernments. California’s NVRA Manual states that “the Secretary of State has
no direct authority over state agencies designated under the NVRA.”161 Nor
155. State Defendants’ Response to the United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
Declaratory Judgment, and Permanent Injunctive Relief at 5–6, United States v. Alabama, 998
F. Supp. 2d 1283 (M.D. Ala. 2014) (No. 2:12-cv-00179-MHT-WC) (citations omitted).
156. Alabama, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 1238 (“Alabama’s contention that it is not its responsi-
bility to ensure compliance with UOCAVA, especially where local county officials transmit
ballots and administer an election, is meritless.”).
157. State of Alabama Office of the Attorney General, Opinion Letter on the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (Feb. 14, 2005), at 6, http://www.ago.state.al.us/opinions/pdf/2005-
068.pdf [http://perma.cc/L434-GH2T].
158. Id.
159. Sallie Owen, Voting Machine Proposal Opposed on Local Level, Mobile Reg., June 9,
2005, at B1.
160. Sebastian Kitchen, Governor: State in Compliance, Press-Reg., Oct. 24, 2007, at 2B.
161. Cal. Sec’y of State Alex Padilla, National Voter Registration Act (NVRA):
California NVRA Manual 5 (2015), http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/nvra/laws-standards/
pdf/complete.pdf [http://perma.cc/46C2-8BBP].
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does the secretary of state “have direct authority over NVRA-designated lo-
cal government agencies.”162 The manual mentions, however, that voluntary
cooperation between state and local agencies “has helped ensure statewide
compliance in California.”163 Vermont has similarly argued, in the context of
a UOCAVA lawsuit, that Congress “seems to have overestimated . . . the
ability of states to compel local authorities to” comply with UOCAVA.164
Although Vermont conceded that state law permits some enforcement ac-
tions against local governments, it argued that Vermont law “does not au-
thorize the Secretary of State to compel the gathering and disclosure of this
data from well-intentioned but overworked town clerks whose primary fo-
cus must be on ensuring that the elections are conducted in an orderly fash-
ion and that each vote – absentee ballots included – is counted.”165
In a Texas version of the liability hot potato game, the secretary of state
argued that she was the wrong defendant in an NVRA case because Texas
delegates election-enforcement authority to county registrars, making the
secretary of state “powerless” to prevent county registrars from disobeying
her.166 In that same case, the county registrar, who was also named in the
suit, argued that she was obligated to enforce the laws of Texas, making her
role merely “ministerial” and making her “a powerless spectator to the . . .
Plaintiffs’ real dispute against the state.”167 The court disagreed and kept
both parties in the litigation.168
Many other states have attempted to avoid liability under the federal
election statutes by either blaming local governments for noncompliance or
arguing that state law makes them powerless to comply.169 South Dakota
state officials unsuccessfully attempted to evade liability under both HAVA
and the NVRA on the state law argument that they had delegated election
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 5 n.2, United States v. Vermont,
No. 2:08-cv-217 (D. Vt. Oct 22, 2008).
165. Id.
166. Voting for Am., Inc. v. Andrade, 888 F. Supp. 2d 816, 828 (S.D. Tex. 2012), rev’d on
other grounds sub nom. Voting for Am., Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2013).
167. Id. at 832.
168. Id. at 833.
169. States are not the only entities that make strategic use of the state-local relationship.
Counties also hide behind states. In Shelby County v. Holder, Shelby County challenged sec-
tions 4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act on the ground that they exceeded Congress’s author-
ity to infringe upon state sovereignty. See 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621–24 (2013). Though Shelby
County itself possesses no state sovereignty, see Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnera-
bility of American Local Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wis. L.
Rev. 83, 85 (“This Article’s basic thesis concerning the constitutional vulnerability of cities
begins from the fact that cities—unlike the states or federal government—have no set place in
the American constitutional structure.”), it was able to invoke the sovereign powers of the state
to argue successfully that the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional. See Justin Weinstein-
Tull, A Localist Critique of Shelby County v. Holder, 11 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 292 (2015) (dis-
cussing whether local governments deserve the federalism protections of their parent states in
the context of voting).
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administration responsibilities to local governments.170 The Louisiana secre-
tary of state unsuccessfully argued that neither the NVRA nor state law gave
him the authority to enforce the NVRA against local governments in Louisi-
ana, and therefore that he was improperly a party to the lawsuit.171 Virginia
state officials unsuccessfully argued that they were entitled to summary
judgment because local electoral boards, and not the state, were responsible
for complying with the relevant provisions of UOCAVA.172
The cases described above demonstrate that many state officials feel that
they do not have the authority—from either state or federal law—to comply
with the federal election statutes, and that they cannot be forced to obtain
that authority pursuant to federal law.
C. State-Local Conflict
Delegating election administration responsibilities to local governments
does not necessarily preordain noncompliance with the federal election stat-
utes. But in practice, conflict between state and local governments over elec-
tion administration can frustrate the statutes’ goals. States and local
governments frequently come to loggerheads over election administration—
and compliance with the federal election statutes specifically—both inside
and outside of the courtroom. This conflict has not previously been ex-
plored, but it provides crucial context for the liability mismatch identified in
the previous Section.
These conflicts come in all permutations. Sometimes counties advocate
stricter compliance with the federal laws than states do. Soon after the
NVRA was enacted, for example, the New York motor vehicles commis-
sioner “complain[ed]” to the state legislature about the cost of compliance
and proposed that New York comply only with the NVRA’s bare require-
ments.173 A county clerk, who pointed out that full compliance with the
NVRA was relatively cheap, disagreed.174 In Illinois, the state initially set up a
dual federal-state voter registration system in order to comply with the min-
imum requirements of the NVRA, which relates only to federal elections.175
County commissioners urged state lawmakers to create a single voter regis-
tration system and allow Illinois residents to register for federal and state
170. See Janis v. Nelson, No. CR. 09–5019–KES, 2009 WL 5216902, at *3–6 (D.S.D. Dec.
30, 2009).
171. See Scott v. Schedler, 771 F.3d 831, 838–39 (5th Cir. 2014).
172. United States v. Cunningham, No. 3:08cv709, 2009 WL 3350028, at *8 (E.D. Va. Oct.
15, 2009); Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, Cunningham,
2009 WL 3350028 (No. 3:08cv709).
173. See Swarts Defends Registration Under Motor Voter Law, Buff. News, May 18, 1995,
at 1.
174. See id.
175. See Susan Kuczka, Lake County Official Asks Lawmakers to Tune up Motor-Voter Re-
gistration, Chi. Trib., Sept. 14, 1995, at 4.
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elections simultaneously.176 In Virginia, also soon after the NVRA was en-
acted, county election officials publicly observed that the state’s failure to
successfully implement the NVRA resulted in a number of voters being
turned away at the polls.177 State officials conceded that a problem existed.178
In Colorado, the secretary of state threatened to sue a Pueblo County elec-
tion official if that official decided to send ballots to military and inactive
overseas voters.179
Often, state laws (perhaps unintentionally) make compliance with the
federal election statutes nearly impossible for counties. This is particularly
true with respect to UOCAVA compliance. As described above, UOCAVA
requires states to transmit ballots to military and overseas voters forty-five
days before an election. Those deadlines run up against state-set filing dead-
lines and late primary or runoff dates. In Texas, for example, the filing dead-
line for the 2012 primary, held in March, was January 2.180 The state
originally scheduled the primary to take place on March 6, to maximize the
state’s impact on the presidential nomination.181 The state ultimately moved
the primary, pursuant to court order in a separate redistricting case.182 But
had the state’s preferred primary date stood, county clerks (and, by exten-
sion, the state) would have struggled to comply with UOCAVA. In an earlier
election, one Texas county elections administrator had to mail 7,500 emer-
gency ballots to meet the forty-five day deadline because a vendor had not
yet produced official ballots.183 In Wisconsin, a forty-nine day gap between
the 2010 primary and general election made it nearly impossible for county
clerks and the state to comply with UOCAVA.184 New York’s and Kansas’s
election schedules make UOCAVA similarly difficult to comply with.185
176. See id.
177. See Craig Timberg, Registrars Fault ‘Motor-Voter’ Law; Many Kept from Polls, N.Va.
Officials Say, Wash. Post, Nov. 6, 1999, at B1 (“ ‘I don’t know what their commitment to
voter registration is. . . . Too many people, too many places, too much handling.’ ” (quoting
Robert W. Beers, Fairfax County registrar)).
178. See id. (“ ‘I think it’s fair to say that statewide it’s not really a problem. But it does
seem to be a problem in Northern Virginia.’ ” (quoting Cameron P. Quinn, secretary of state
Board of Elections)).
179. Jordan Steffen, Pueblo Clerk Backs Down on Ballots; Gessler Sends a Letter Threatening
a Lawsuit over Inactive Voters, Denv. Post, Oct. 2, 2011, at B12.
180. Gloria Padilla, Well-Intentioned Military Voting Act Is a Headache for Many, San
Antonio Express-News, Mar. 5, 2011, at 9B.
181. Tom Schoenberg & Laurel Brubaker Calkins, Texas Primary Election Scheduled for




183. Padilla, supra note 180.
184. Jason Stein, State Waiver for Overseas Ballots Denied: Forty-Five Days Before Election Is
Tough Timetable for Clerks, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Aug. 28, 2010, at 1.
185. See Mary Clarkin, Efforts to Ensure Soldiers’ Ballots Correct, Hutchinson News, Mar.
26, 2011; Lou Michel, Missing Deadline for Military Mail, Election Boards Hope for the Best,
Buff. News, Oct. 19, 2010, at B2.
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The complicated relationships between state and local governments that
the federal election statutes engage occasionally play out in litigation as well.
Just as states have attempted to toss the liability hot potato to counties,
counties have attempted the same maneuver against states.
An NVRA case out of Mississippi provides a rich example of state-local
conflict in litigation because it was brought against both state and local offi-
cials.186 In True the Vote v. Hosemann, private plaintiffs sued state officials as
well as the election commissions of a number of Mississippi counties pursu-
ant to the NVRA’s public disclosure provision seeking voting records from
the 2014 Senate election.187 The plaintiffs sued both state and county officials
because they alleged that the county officials “carried out a policy disregard-
ing the plain language of the NVRA” at the secretary of state’s direction, and
that “[t]he Secretary relies on the County Defendants to carry out his re-
sponsibilities under the NVRA.”188
All parties sought to avoid liability. Mississippi Secretary of State
Hosemann stated as a defense that he was “not a proper party to plaintiffs’
putative causes of action asserted.”189 Channeling Missouri, Hosemann ar-
gued that he had no “authority or duty to enforce NVRA’s public disclosure
provision, or any state laws, against Mississippi’s 82 locally elected Circuit
Clerks” and that neither the NVRA nor state law required him to “enforce
the [NVRA] against local officials.”190 The Hinds County Election Commis-
sion, one of the defendants in the suit, argued the opposite: that the NVRA
applies to state election officials, not county officials.191
Neither argument persuaded the court. Recognizing that “[s]tate elec-
tion officials are certainly responsible for enforcing Federal laws relating to
elections,” the court held that “[c]ounties also must comply with these stat-
utes.”192 At the same time, the court reaffirmed the state’s responsibility: “To
the extent a State delegates record-maintenance and disclosure duties to lo-
cal governments, the State nevertheless remains responsible if documents are
not properly disclosed under the Public Disclosure Provision.”193
186. True the Vote v. Hosemann, 43 F. Supp. 3d 693, 699–700, 702 (S.D. Miss. 2014).
187. Id. at 700 & nn.2–3.
188. Plaintiffs True the Vote et al.’s Brief in Support of Omnibus Response to the County
Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motions at 8, Hosemann, 43 F. Supp. 3d 693 (No. 3:14-cv-
00532-NFA).
189. Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann’s Answer and Defenses to Plaintiffs’ Complaint
at 14, Hosemann, 43 F. Supp. 3d 693 (No. 3:14cv532-NFA).
190. Brief of Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann in Opposition to Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment at 33, Hosemann, 43 F. Supp. 3d 693 (No. 3:14cv532-NFA) (citing United
States v. Missouri, 535 F.3d 844, 849–51 (8th Cir. 2008)).
191. Hinds County, Mississippi Election Commission’s Memorandum of Authorities in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 14–15, Hosemann, 43 F. Supp. 3d 693 (No.
3:14cv00532-NFA).
192. Hosemann, 43 F. Supp. 3d at 712.
193. Id. at 713.
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State-local conflict took a different form in a HAVA case against New
York. Whereas Mississippi and its counties tried to escape liability by blam-
ing each other, New York counties moved to intervene as defendants in the
HAVA case because they did not feel well-represented by the state. Here is
Putnam County, asking to intervene:
The State has made compliance impossible by failing to certify a list of
approved voting systems in sufficient time for local boards to undertake all
the necessary preparations for an orderly transition to the new machines.
As a result of the State’s inaction, Putnam County now stands to lose a
significant amount of federal HAVA funds allocated to the Putnam County
Board of Elections . . . to be used to replace lever voting machines as man-
dated by HAVA and state law. An equally dire prospect, the County also
faces the prospect of a disorderly and unaccountable election, should it not
be permitted adequate time to implement the HAVA mandates.
It is imperative that the Intervenors, along with the other counties
seeking intervention in this action, be permitted to intervene in this action
since these are the entities which must actually implement, at the ground
level, the HAVA mandates.194
Other counties made similar arguments.195 Nassau County argued that New
York vests responsibility for HAVA compliance with local boards of elec-
tions, in addition to the state.196 Two members of the Albany County Board
of Elections posted an article entitled “The County Dilemma: The Impact of
the Help America Vote Act on New York State.” The article suggested that
the timetable set by the HAVA lawsuit provided an insufficient amount of
time to transition to new voting machines and advocated waiting another
election cycle to properly make the transition.197 Conflict between New York
and its counties persisted throughout the litigation.198
Local governments attempt to hold onto their elections authority when
states attempt to co-opt it. In Ohio, for instance, the state sought to comply
with HAVA’s voting system requirements by selecting the type of voting sys-
tem to be used throughout the state.199 Two lawsuits, including one by a
194. Memorandum of Law in Support of Intervention at 1, United States v. N.Y. State Bd.
of Elections, No. 06 Civ. 0263 (GLS) (N.D.N.Y. July 25, 2007).
195. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Intervention at 2, United States v. N.Y.
State Bd. of Elections, No. CV 06 0263 (GLS) (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2007) (“The unrealistic and
ever-changing timelines developed by the State make compliance by the County Boards of
Elections impossible.”).
196. Answer of Defendants-Intervenors Nassau County Board of Elections and Nassau
County Legislature ¶ 6, United States v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, No. 06 Civ. 0263 (GLS)
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2006).
197. John A. Graziano & James M. Clancy, The County Dilemma: The Impact of the Help
America Vote Act on New York State, albanyweblog.com (Oct. 31, 2006), http://
www.albanyweblog.com/2006/11-Nov/11-02-06_Ref_01.html [http://perma.cc/3GUL-HYXM].
198. See, e.g., Letter Brief of the United States at 3–4, United States v. N.Y. State Bd. of
Elections, No. 06-CV-00263 (GLS) (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2012) (asking the court to hold the
state of New York in contempt for failing to comply with the remedial order in the case).
199. Damschroder, supra note 79, at 199.
March 2016] Election Law Federalism 775
county government, were filed on the ground that county governments, and
not the state, held the authority to choose voting systems.200
It is no surprise that state and local governments struggle over power,
even though that power is, in theory, created and meted out exclusively by
the state.201 Federal law exists against the backdrop of these complicated
struggles; identifying them provides crucial context for understanding how
the federal election statutes operate in practice.
II. Election Law Federalism and Sovereignty
As demonstrated above, the federal election statutes implicate a wide
range of federalism issues. They do so because of the unusual features inher-
ent in the federal regulation of elections. This Part defines those features and
situates them within the broader universe of federal policy.
A. Defining Election Law Federalism
The idea of federalism refers to our system of parallel federal and state
governance. “The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of
their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and
one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.”202 Federalism can
mean many things; it “has always been understood to be a multi-headed
beast, with courts and scholars routinely deploying multiple and conflicting
accounts of what states do.”203
Here, “election law federalism” describes the complex set of relation-
ships implicated by federal election legislation. I argue that election law fed-
eralism is defined by two distinct features—expansive federal power to
regulate and widespread state prerogative to delegate—that both partly ex-
plain the widespread noncompliance with the federal election statutes and
raise unusual federalism and policy questions for election law. The remain-
der of this Section develops and describes these two features.
Identifying the distinct structure of election law federalism raises both
descriptive and normative concerns. As a descriptive matter, I seek to set
forth a full account of the relationships at play in enforcing and complying
with federal election legislation. As a normative matter, I propose a frame-
work for thinking about how best to understand federal-state-local relation-
ships in administering elections. Better understanding these relationships
200. Id. at 199 & n.13.
201. State law determines the power balance between the state and local governments. For
examples of political fights about state oversight over local governments in the elections con-
text, see Doug Chapin, Who’s the Boss? Arkansas, Florida Debate State Power to Discipline Local
Election Officials, Election Academy (Apr. 25, 2013), http://editions.lib.umn.edu/election
academy/2013/04/25/whos-the-boss-arkansas-florida/ [http://perma.cc/Z3BE-Z7QP].
202. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
203. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 10 (2010).
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can provide insights into both ensuring compliance with these statutes and
optimally structuring Elections Clause legislation in the future.
1. Expansive Federal Power to Legislate
Congress has broad constitutional authority pursuant to the Elections
Clause to enact voting legislation. The Elections Clause states that “[t]he
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representa-
tives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as
to the Place of chusing Senators.”204 The history of the Elections Clause as
well as contemporary doctrine demonstrate that the Clause gives Congress
unusually far-reaching authority to enact election law.
At the founding, the Elections Clause ensured that the federal govern-
ment could conduct federal elections even if a state refused to do so. In The
Federalist, Hamilton wrote that “every government ought to contain in itself
the means of its own preservation.”205 The Elections Clause was that means.
Giving the power to administer federal elections wholly to the states “would
leave the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy. They could at any
moment annihilate it, by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons to
administer its affairs.”206
Specifically, the Clause was forged from the discussion over whether
Congress should have veto power over all state laws. Commentators have
characterized Congress’s Elections Clause authority as a “compromise
power.”207 That is, a compromise between a general veto and an extremely
narrow veto to be exercised only if states “failed to call for congressional
elections or passed electoral laws that otherwise subverted rights protected
by the Constitution.”208 Instead, the framers decided on a veto over only
state laws concerning the important functions of representation and vot-
ing.209 The founders thus understood that the Elections Clause could func-
tion as a congressional veto over state election laws, to be used at Congress’s
discretion.
The Supreme Court’s recent case law has reaffirmed Congress’s compre-
hensive authority under the Elections Clause.210 In Arizona v. Inter Tribal
204. U.S. Const. art. I., § 4.
205. The Federalist No. 59, at 330 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis deleted).
206. Id.
207. See Tolson, supra note 4, at 1223.
208. Id. at 1225 (citing Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Consti-
tution 1787-1788, at 448 (2010)).
209. Id. at 1223.
210. Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the
Voting Rights Act, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 1, 16 (2007) (“The Supreme Court’s recent decisions
under the Elections Clause have confirmed the longstanding interpretation of the clause as a
grant of essentially plenary authority.”).
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Council of Arizona, Inc.,211 the Court considered whether the NVRA’s re-
quirement that states “accept and use” a uniform federal voter registration
form that does not require proof of citizenship preempted an Arizona law
requiring evidence of citizenship to register to vote.212
The Court held that the “broad” substantive scope of the Elections
Clause did preempt the state law.213 The “Times, Places and Manner” of the
Elections Clause are “ ‘comprehensive words,’ which ‘embrace authority to
provide a complete code for congressional elections,’ including . . . regula-
tions relating to ‘registration.’ ”214 The Elections Clause “invests the States
with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but only so
far as Congress declines to pre-empt state legislative choices.”215 Congress’s
power over the “Times, Places and Manner” of congressional elections “is
paramount, and may be exercised at any time, and to any extent which it
deems expedient; and so far as it is exercised, and no farther, the regulations
effected supersede those of the State which are inconsistent therewith.”216
Most importantly for our purposes, the Court considered and rejected
the idea that Elections Clause legislation must satisfy the “plain statement”
rule of Gregory v. Ashcroft.217 That rule states that when Congress alters the
traditional balance between state and federal governments by legislating in
areas typically regulated by states, it must make its intentions clear by plain
statement.218 In Arizona, the Court held that the assumption motivating
Gregory—that Congress is naturally reluctant to preempt state laws—does
not hold when Congress exercises its Elections Clause authority.219 Any fed-
eral election legislation that alters the “[t]imes, [p]laces and [m]anner” of
holding congressional elections “necessarily displaces some element of a pre-
existing legal regime erected by the States.”220 That is, because the Elections
Clause confers the “power to pre-empt, the reasonable assumption is that
the statutory text accurately communicates the scope of Congress’s pre-emp-
tive intent.”221 Moreover, “the States’ role in regulating congressional elec-
tions—while weighty and worthy of respect—has always existed subject to
the express qualification that it ‘terminates according to federal law.’ ”222
Lower courts have applied this broad understanding of Congress’s au-
thority under the Elections Clause. In United States v. Slone, for example, the
Sixth Circuit considered a constitutional challenge to a federal statute
211. 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013).
212. Arizona, 133 S. Ct. at 2251.
213. Id. at 2253.
214. Id. at 2249, 2253 (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932)).
215. Id. at 2253 (quoting Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997)).
216. Id. at 2253–54 (quoting Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392 (1880)).
217. See id. at 2256–57.
218. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991).
219. Arizona, 133 S. Ct. at 2256.
220. Id. at 2257 (footnote omitted).
221. Id.
222. Id. (quoting Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001)).
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criminalizing vote-buying on the ground that Congress had no authority to
regulate nonfederal elections.223 Relying on the broad powers conferred by
the Elections Clause, the court upheld the statute.224 In other cases challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the NVRA, some of which are described above,
lower courts have held that Congress’s Elections Clause authority exceeds its
Commerce Clause authority.225 In one Seventh Circuit case, for example, the
court rejected an argument that Congress could not force Illinois to admin-
ister the NVRA.226 In Judge Posner’s words, in the context of election legisla-
tion, “Congress was given the whip hand.”227
2. Widespread State Prerogative to Delegate
States have delegated significant election responsibilities to local govern-
ments, such as counties and townships.228 This delegation creates elections
that Alec Ewald calls “hyperfederalized”229: many key election decisions get
made at the local level. The degree and kind of decentralization varies by
state, but nearly all aspects of election administration are delegated to local
governments by at least some set of states.230
Most relevant for this Article, states delegate significant absentee ballot
and voter registration responsibilities to local governments. Alabama, for
example, designates county circuit clerks to be “absentee election man-
ager[s]” who administer the absentee ballot process.231 The absentee election
manager accepts absentee ballot applications and transmits those ballots.232
The Alabama secretary of state plays a role, however, by supplying the ab-
sentee ballot application form, including a special form for military and
223. 411 F.3d 643, 648–50 (6th Cir. 2005).
224. Slone, 411 F.3d at 649–50 (“Under the Elections Clause, Congress is authorized to
protect the integrity of federal elections. . . . It is for Congress to chose [sic] the means that ‘are
plainly adapted to that end.’ ” (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421
(1819))).
225. See, e.g., Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing Con-
gress’s broad powers pursuant to the Elections Clause from its more limited powers pursuant
to the Commerce Clause, and noting that “[t]he Elections Clause also gives a broad grant of
power to Congress, allowing it to define the boundaries of state transgressions and to remedy
any wrongdoing”); Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 836–37 (6th
Cir. 1997) (noting that unlike the Spending Clause, the Elections Clause “explicitly grants
Congress the authority to force states to alter their regulations regarding federal regulations,
and does not condition its grant of authority on federal reimbursement”).
226. ACORN v. Edgar, 56 F.3d 791, 794 (7th Cir. 1995).
227. Id. (distinguishing the anticommandeering doctrine of New York v. United States in
the context of Congress’s Elections Clause powers).
228. See generally Gerken, supra note 29; Tokaji, supra note 28.
229. Ewald, supra note 27, at 3.
230. See id. at 3–4.
231. See Ala. Code § 17-11-2 (2007). If the circuit clerk declines this responsibility, the
county may appoint an alternate. Id.
232. See id. §§ 17-11-4 to -5.
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overseas voters.233 Split arrangements like this one—where the state provides
some resources and the local governments administer the actual absentee
ballot transmission and counting process—are common.234
Local governments also play a prominent role in the voter registration
process. In North Carolina, for example, county boards of election adminis-
ter the registration process.235 North Carolina itself maintains a centralized
registration list, but county boards provide list maintenance.236 As it is with
absentee voting, this sort of state-local division of responsibility for voter
registration is common among states.237
States delegate many other responsibilities as well. Local governments
play a significant role in funding elections, training poll workers, and select-
ing voting systems.238 As of 2002, many states provided no funding at all to
local governments to administer elections.239 Twenty-two states reimbursed
local governments for parts of the election administration process.240 Only
nine states paid the majority of election costs.241 With respect to poll worker
training, many states provide training, but fewer than half provide
mandatory training.242 Only seven states have a poll worker certification pro-
cess that requires local poll workers to be trained according to state require-
ments.243 The remaining states either provide optional training to local poll
workers or no training at all.244
States oversee their local governments to varying degrees.245 Some states
appoint precinct officials themselves and either maintain control over voting
233. See id. § 17-11-4.
234. See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, §§ 2531, 2532, 2536, 2582, 2586 (2012) (making local
governments in Vermont responsible for accepting absentee ballot applications, transmitting
absentee ballots, and counting absentee ballots; the Vermont secretary of state provides absen-
tee ballot envelopes and forms for counting votes). Rhode Island, on the other hand, which
has one of the most centralized elections programs in the country, requires local boards of
elections to certify absentee ballot applications to the secretary of state, who transmits and
receives those ballots directly from voters. See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 17-20-2.1, -10, -26 (2013).
235. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 163-82.1(b) (2013).
236. See id. § 163-82.14(a).
237. See, e.g., Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 115.141, .158 (West 2015) (placing local election author-
ities in charge of voter registration and giving the state and local election authorities shared
responsibility for maintaining the statewide voter list).
238. See Weinstein-Tull, supra note 169, at 296–98 (describing how states delegate election
responsibilities to counties generally); Election Reform Briefing, supra note 40, at 5–10.
239. See Election Reform Briefing, supra note 40, at 6.
240. Id.
241. Id. The Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2012) (recodified
at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145), now provides some federal funding for the purchase of voting
systems, but that funding is “quite limited”; states and local governments continue to bear the
financial burden of funding elections. Ewald, supra note 27, at 4.
242. Election Reform Briefing, supra note 40, at 6.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Jeanne Richman & Robert Outis, State Control of Election Administration, in Issues
of Electoral Reform 117, 118 (Richard J. Carlson ed., 1974).
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rolls or closely monitor local management.246 Other states issue enforceable
guidelines, rules, regulations, or instructions that require local governments
to administer election activities in specific ways.247 Other states participate in
the local decisionmaking process by installing state election officials on local
election boards.248 Most states take a hands-off approach. Of the twenty-nine
states where the secretary of state has authority over elections, only one-
third of those secretaries have actual rulemaking authority.249 In the rest of
the states, that authority lies with local governments.250
B. Tension with Federalism Doctrines
The combination of these two properties—strong federal regulation and
broad state delegation—puts the federal election statutes in an unusual posi-
tion: the Elections Clause permits Congress to legislate in a way that creates
tension with traditional federalism doctrines. Specifically, the federal elec-
tion statutes appear to violate the anticommandeering principle and the
principle of state control over their subdivisions. In the context of election
law, however, courts have held that the Elections Clause immunizes the stat-
utes from these concerns. Nonetheless, I suggest that the tension between
the federal election statutes and these federalism principles may explain
some of the widespread noncompliance with the statutes. This Section de-
scribes these federalism principles—anticommandeering and state control
over subdivisions—and explains how the federal election statutes implicate
them.
1. Anticommandeering
Because the federal election statutes place responsibility for compliance
on states, and because states delegate that responsibility to local govern-
ments, bringing states into compliance with the statutes can mean asking
states to take significant legal and political action. Specifically, states must
either: (1) require local governments to carry out the objectives of the stat-
utes through state legislation; or (2) enforce the statutes legally against local
governments. States perceive these requirements to violate the anticom-
mandeering doctrine.
The anticommandeering principle, recognized by the Supreme Court in
New York v. United States251 and Printz v. United States,252 states that the
federal government may not “compel the States to implement, by legislation
246. Id. at 119–20.
247. Id. at 120–22.
248. Id. at 122. In Kentucky, for example, the state board of elections appoints two of four
officials on each local elections commission. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 117.035 (LexisNexis 2014).
249. Election Reform Briefing, supra note 40, at 7.
250. Id.
251. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
252. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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or executive action, federal regulatory programs.”253 In New York, the Court
struck down a federal statute that forced states to take title to low-level radi-
oactive waste unless the state could dispose of that waste—either itself or
through an interstate compact—by a certain date.254 In Printz, the Court
struck down a part of the Brady Act that required state and local law en-
forcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun
buyers.255 New York held that Congress cannot compel a state “to enact or
enforce a federal regulatory program.”256 Printz in turn found that Congress
may not circumvent that prohibition by conscripting state officers directly.257
These cases are premised on the idea that although Congress may en-
courage states to regulate a federal priority by offering incentives, it may not
force a state to regulate.258 Congress may also give states the choice between
regulating a policy area itself or allowing Congress to do so in an area where
Congress is authorized to regulate.259 Permitting Congress to commandeer
state legislatures and officials diminishes accountability, the Court noted in
New York, because it obscures from public view the actor that compels the
regulation.260
For states like Missouri that have delegated election administration re-
sponsibility to local governments,261 the anticommandeering doctrine sits
uneasily with the federal election statutes. If local governments are the state
bodies responsible for the kinds of conduct required by the federal election
statutes (voter registration, transmitting overseas ballots, choosing voting
equipment, etc.), and if those local governments are out of compliance, a
noncompliant state must take administrative or legal action to bring those
local governments into compliance. A state might argue (as Missouri did)
that requiring the state to take legal action amounts to conscripting state
officials, violating the anticommandeering doctrine articulated in Printz.262
For states that believe state law does not permit state officials to bring
local governments into compliance with the statutes—as Vermont, Alabama,
253. Printz, 521 U.S. at 925.
254. New York, 505 U.S. at 153–54, 186–88.
255. Printz, 521 U.S. at 902, 933.
256. New York, 505 U.S. at 188; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (noting the holding of New
York).
257. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
258. New York, 505 U.S. at 167–69.
259. Id. at 167–68.
260. Id. at 168–69.
261. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
262. See, e.g., Appellees’ Brief at 46–47, United States v. Missouri, 535 F.3d 844 (8th Cir.
2008) (No. 07-2322), 2007 WL 6603869, at *46–47 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 175, 178)
(“[E]ven if state officials could bring state criminal and other enforcement actions, the U.S.’
apparent contention that Congress, through the NVRA, requires such proceedings raises seri-
ous constitutional problems. While Congress has vast power under the Elections Clause, it
may not co-opt a State’s decision to prosecute violations of state law.”).
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and California have claimed263—the statutes potentially require states to en-
act new legislation, in tension with the anticommandeering doctrine articu-
lated in New York. Even states that neither delegate nor lack enforcement
power against local governments have employed anticommandeering argu-
ments.264 For example, California argued, in a petition for certiorari that the
Supreme Court denied, that the NVRA impermissibly commandeered the
state government to implement federal voter registration priorities.265
Courts have rejected these arguments, largely by distinguishing the
source of congressional power in anticommandeering cases from that in vot-
ing cases. The anticommandeering cases are grounded in a Commerce
Clause analysis, this reasoning goes, whereas the federal election statutes are
enacted pursuant to Congress’s Elections Clause authority.266 This reasoning
finds support in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Inter Tribal, in
which the Supreme Court held that the Elections Clause permits Congress to
alter state election regulations when it chooses.267 These cases suggest that
Congress may enact election legislation that forces a state to take action it
might not otherwise take, without violating the anticommandeering
doctrine.
But this reasoning misses an important difference between the federal
election statutes and policies held to violate the Tenth Amendment: state
delegation of election administration responsibilities to local governments is
a state decision, and the legal relationships between states and their local
governments are a matter of state law. Under the Constitution, states are
responsible for determining the “Times, Places and Manner” of elections.268
That states have chosen to delegate that responsibility to local governments
should not prevent the federal government from exercising its own constitu-
tional authority to override those regulations. That is, state delegation to
local governments should not serve as a barrier to federal regulation under
the Elections Clause.269
263. See supra notes 157–165 and accompanying text.
264. See, e.g., ACORN v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 835–36 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Citing New York v.
United States, Michigan claims that the Act is unconstitutional because it conscripts state agen-
cies, personnel, and funds to further a federal purpose, thereby impinging upon basic princi-
ples of federalism and violating the Tenth Amendment.” (citation omitted)).
265. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15–16, Wilson v. Voting Rights Coal., 516 U.S. 1093
(1996) (mem.) (No. 95-673), 1995 WL 17048226, at *15–16; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of
Pacific Legal Foundation and the States of Arizona, Idaho, New Hampshire, and South Caro-
lina in Support of Petitioners at 17, Wilson, 516 U.S. 1093, 1995 WL 17048406, at *17 (“If the
Constitution prohibits Congress from forcing state legislatures to legislate, it follows that Con-
gress cannot step into the shoes of the state Legislature and commandeer state agencies simply
to do their bidding.”).
266. See, e.g., ACORN, 129 F.3d at 836; Wilson v. United States, 878 F. Supp. 1324,
1327–28 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
267. See supra notes 219–222 and accompanying text.
268. U.S. Const. art. I § 4.
269. Although the Supremacy Clause might seem applicable here, the Supreme Court has
explained that because statutes like the NVRA are enacted pursuant to the Elections Clause,
March 2016] Election Law Federalism 783
2. State Control over Subdivisions
Implicit in the idea that the federal election statutes create a mismatch
between the role states would like to play—vis-à-vis their local govern-
ments—and the role they must play to comply with the statutes is another
tension with traditional federalism doctrines: that these statutes diminish
state authority to define and direct their local governments.
The federal government has some, but not unlimited, control over how
a state chooses to order its own structure of government. Take the early case
of Coyle v. Smith, in which the Court considered whether an Oklahoma law
moving the state capitol from Guthrie to Oklahoma City conflicted with an
act of Congress permitting Oklahoma to join the union and setting
Oklahoma’s capitol in Guthrie.270 Finding that “[t]he power to locate its own
seat of government and to determine when and how it shall be changed
from one place to another, and to appropriate its own public funds for that
purpose, are essentially and peculiarly state powers,”271 the Court held that
Oklahoma was not admitted to the union on equal footing with her sister
states, in violation of the Constitution.272 Oklahoma, “by virtue of her juris-
dictional sovereignty as such a State may determine for her own people the
proper location of the local seat of government.”273 Another example is
Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, where the Court determined that a Virginia
statute delegating milk pricing powers to a commission was not an unlawful
delegation of state powers: “How power shall be distributed by a state
among its governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a question for
the state itself.”274 There are thus some powers that relate to a state’s internal
organization that a state is uniquely competent to exercise.275
State control over its own subdivisions was solidified into a “canon”276
in a line of cases beginning with Gregory v. Ashcroft.277 In Gregory, the Court
upheld a Missouri law that imposed mandatory retirement on state judges at
which is “none other than the power to pre-empt,” Supremacy Clause doctrine is inapposite.
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2250 (2013).
270. 221 U.S. 559, 563–64 (1911).
271. Coyle, 221 U.S. at 565 (emphasis added).
272. Id. at 579–80.
273. Id. at 579.
274. 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937).
275. For other examples, see Merritt, supra note 23, at 40–50 (arguing generally that the
Guarantee Clause of the Constitution is a better justification for these state powers than the
Tenth Amendment).
276. See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era
of State Sovereignty, 93 Va. L. Rev. 959, 984–90 (2007) (noting the canon and describing the
doctrine of state control over its subdivisions).
277. 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).
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age seventy.278 The Court upheld the law despite the federal Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, which prohibits employers—including state em-
ployers—from discriminating on the basis of age.279 The Court held that to
disrupt the traditional federal-state balance, which includes permitting the
states to structure their governments as they see fit, Congress must make a
“plain statement” of its intention to do so.280 This is because “[t]hrough the
structure of its government . . . a State defines itself as a sovereign.”281 Struc-
turing its government (here, setting a retirement age for judges) “is a deci-
sion of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity.”282
The Court also applied this plain-statement rule to a case involving pre-
emption that would have altered the balance of power between the state of
Missouri and its subdivisions. In Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League, the
Court considered whether the Telecommunications Act of 1996—which pre-
vented state and local governments from prohibiting any entity from provid-
ing telecommunications services—preempted a Missouri law prohibiting all
of its own subdivisions from offering telecommunications services.283 Pre-
empting the state law would free local governments to offer telecommunica-
tions services. The Court held that the Telecom Act did not preempt the
Missouri law because the “liberating preemption would come only by inter-
posing federal authority between a State and its municipal subdivisions,
which our precedents teach, ‘are created as convenient agencies for exercis-
ing such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to
them in its absolute discretion.’ ”284 Instead, the Court invoked its “working
assumption that federal legislation threatening to trench on the States’ ar-
rangements for conducting their own governments should be treated with
great skepticism, and read in a way that preserves a State’s chosen disposi-
tion of its own power, in the absence of the plain statement Gregory
requires.”285
A state’s power to control its own subdivisions is not plenary, however.
Congress has authority to alter a state’s internal structure in a number of
situations. The federal government had the authority for years, pursuant to
the Voting Rights Act, to block fundamental state ordering in the form of
state and local government redistricting that discriminated against minority
voters.286 The Constitution requires states to adhere to the “one person, one
278. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 456.
279. Id. at 467.
280. Id. at 460–61.
281. Id. at 460.
282. Id.; see also Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct.
2652, 2673 (2015) (“[I]t is characteristic of our federal system that States retain autonomy to
establish their own governmental processes.”).
283. Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 128–29 (2004).
284. Id. at 140 (quoting Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 607–08 (1991)).
285. Id.
286. E.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 423–43 (2006).
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vote” principle, which restricts state freedom in apportioning legislative dis-
tricts.287 A state may not delegate legislative authority to religious organiza-
tions.288 And the Court has upheld federal legislation that limits state
freedom to organize its own government when those limits are incentivized
with financial reward to the states.289
States that have been sued pursuant to the federal election statutes have
raised arguments that invoke their control over their own subdivisions. Spe-
cifically, states have argued that the statutes seriously alter the balance of
power between states and their counties, and that Congress would have said
so explicitly if it intended such serious consequences.290 Lower courts have
rejected these arguments, noting generally that the clear-statement rule does
not apply to Elections Clause legislation.291 In Inter Tribal, the Supreme
Court agreed.292
However, an important difference remains between the federal election
statutes and the federal laws that permissibly restrict state organization of its
subdivisions. To enact Spending Clause legislation, Congress must incen-
tivize optional restrictions with funding.293 To enact Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendment legislation, Congress must justify the legislation with
voluminous records and evidence.294 To enact voting regulations, however,
Congress need only pass a law; given its Elections Clause authority, it need
not jump through additional hoops.295
C. Differences with Other Public Policies
In addition to being in tension with traditional federalism doctrines, the
federal election statutes implicate different federalism relationships from
287. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554–61 (1964).
288. E.g., Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982).
289. Merritt, supra note 23, at 46–49 (listing examples).
290. See, e.g., United States v. Missouri, No. 05-4391-CV-C-NKL, 2006 WL 1446356, at *7
(W.D. Mo. May 23, 2006), rev’d, United States v. Missouri, 535 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 2008).
291. E.g., Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, 454–55 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that the
plain-statement rule does not apply to the NVRA because Congress enacted the NVRA pursu-
ant to its Elections Clause authority).
292. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2256–57 (2013)
(noting that Gregory and the clear-statement rule do not apply to the NVRA because “[t]here
is good reason for treating Elections Clause legislation differently”).
293. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) (upholding a law that withheld
federal highway funds from states that did not adopt a minimum drinking age of twenty-one).
294. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997) (striking down the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act in part because Congress enacted that law pursuant to its Four-
teenth Amendment enforcement authority but failed to identify a pattern of discriminatory
activity that justified the act).
295. To be clear, I do not raise this point to suggest that the standard for congressional
authority under the Elections Clause ought to be something different from what it currently is.
I raise this point to note that Elections Clause legislation stands in tension with the traditional
federalism doctrine that, except in limited circumstances, states should maintain control over
the ordering of their political subdivisions.
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those of other major federal policies. Those policies follow the “cooperative
federalism” model, in which the federal government uses its Commerce
Clause or Spending Clause authority to enact requirements that are admin-
istered by state agencies.296 The federal government cajoles states into ad-
ministering these requirements by using Spending Clause incentives or
threats that the federal government itself will regulate private conduct if the
state fails to. But in none of these situations does the federal government
require states to enact its priorities without financial incentives, the possibil-
ity that the federal government will itself regulate the conduct, or significant
evidence that the regulated conduct affects interstate commerce.
Consider, for example, federal environmental legislation. The Clean Air
Act asks states to create “implementation plans”297 in order to implement
federal environmental standards.298 Creating these plans is optional—if
states decline or fail to implement plans that meet the federal standards, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will design and enforce its own im-
plementation plan.299 The Clean Air Act also gives the EPA power to incen-
tivize state compliance with the federal standards with financial and other
kinds of rewards and penalties.300 The Clean Water Act301 and other environ-
mental laws302 operate similarly.
Health care is another area of federal public policy that implicates differ-
ent federalism relationships from those implicated by the federal election
statutes. Medicaid, long the cornerstone of federal health care policy, is a
cooperative federalism program because it offers federal money to states that
296. See Weiser, supra note 26, at 665 (“In reality, however, Congress continues to enact
‘cooperative federalism’ regulatory programs that invite state agencies to implement federal
law.”).
297. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2012).
298. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 Md. L. Rev.
1183, 1195–96 (1995).
299. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c).
300. See Dwyer, supra note 298, at 1196–97.
301. See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal Sys-
tem: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States, the
States, and Their Citizens?, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1552, 1555 (1995) (characterizing the Clean Water
Act as a federal-state partnership and noting the EPA’s authority to assume control over a state
discharge program that does not satisfy federal standards).
302. See id. at 1571 (“[E]ssentially all the modern major environmental laws provide uni-
form, minimum national standards with the states ‘deputized,’ to a greater or lesser degree, to
do the permitting and enforcing for the federal government.”); Margaret H. Lemos, State En-
forcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 698, 715–16 (2011) (discussing the Clean Air Act’s
implementation plans as an example of cooperative federalism and noting similarity to other
statutes).
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implement Medicaid programs.303 Like the Clean Air Act, Medicaid is volun-
tary; states may refuse federal money and decline to cover low-income indi-
viduals in their states.304 The Affordable Care Act similarly implicates
different federalism relationships between the federal and state govern-
ments.305 The Court emphasized the idea that the federal government cannot
coerce states into implementing a federal program in National Federation of
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius,306 when it struck down the provision of
the Affordable Care Act that effectively mandated Medicaid expansion. That
provision punished states that refused to expand their Medicaid programs
by authorizing the Department of Health and Human Services to cut their
Medicaid funding.307 The Court held that the statute coerced states into im-
plementing the expansion, which exceeded Congress’s authority.308
Telecommunications policy provides another example of a federal law
that creates federal-state relationships different from those created by the
federal election statutes. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires states
to broker agreements between existing telecommunications providers and
new entrants into the local telephone market.309 However, the Telecommuni-
cations Act takes commandeering concerns into account by making state
agency cooperation optional.310 The Telecommunications Act “offers states
the opportunity to implement its essential goal of bringing competition to
local telephone markets by arbitrating disputes relating to the terms under
which new entrants will cooperate with incumbent providers.”311
The area of public policy that implicates federalism relationships most
similar to election law federalism is education. Most states have delegated
significant education policymaking authority to local governments and
303. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1; Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of
State-Based Dissent to Federal Health Reform, 39 Hofstra L. Rev. 111, 134–35 (2010) (dis-
cussing the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion as a version of cooperative federalism).
304. Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program: A Challenge to
Federalism, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 855, 860 (1990). All states participate in the program; Arizona was
the last to join in 1982. Leonard, supra note 303, at 135 & n.159.
305. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Imple-
mentation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 Yale L.J. 534, 584–94 (2011)
(noting that the Affordable Care Act contains no fewer than five different kinds of federalism
relationships—none of which mirror the relationships implicated by the federal election
statutes).
306. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
307. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607.
308. Id.
309. Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications Reform,
52 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 16–17 (1999).
310. Weiser, supra note 26, at 676 (“Sensitive to the limits imposed by the Supreme Court
on commandeering state agencies into a federal regulatory program, the Telecom Act, like
other modern cooperative federalism programs, does not require state agencies to participate
in its implementation.”).
311. Id. (emphasis added).
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school boards.312 Local control over public education is deeply rooted in the
country’s fabric and “essential both to the maintenance of community con-
cern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational pro-
cess.”313 School districts, like county governments that administer elections,
have no distinct place in the constitutional order.314 Despite these similari-
ties, Congress enacts federal education legislation pursuant to its Spending
Clause authority.315 Unlike election legislation, the federal government exerts
influence over state and local education policy through the promise of fund-
ing, not the threat of litigation.
Congress can also regulate public and private conduct directly when it
acts pursuant to its Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment authority.
For example, the Court has permitted Congress to set minimum wage laws
that apply to state and local governments.316 Congress uses its Commerce
Clause power to enact most criminal laws.317 And Congress enacted the
Family and Medical Leave Act—which requires employers (including public
employers) to provide employees with family and medical leave—pursuant
to its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority.318 But to enact these
statutes, Congress must compile vast records demonstrating that the regu-
lated conduct either significantly affects interstate commerce or remedies
pervasive discrimination.319
There are, of course, many other policy areas that engage with federal-
ism,320 but the pattern is consistent: federal legislation treads lightly when it
312. Michael Heise, The Political Economy of Education Federalism, 56 Emory L.J. 125,
130–31 (2006).
313. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (1974) (overturning a federal district
court’s order imposing a multidistrict busing desegregation scheme despite no evidence of a
multidistrict segregation problem, in part because “[n]o single tradition in public education is
more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools”).
314. Shannon K. McGovern, Note, A New Model for States as Laboratories for Reform: How
Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1519, 1530 (2011). Debate exists among
scholars as to just how independent school districts are from states. Compare id. at 1529–30
(noting that school districts have “de facto local autonomy” recognized by courts (quoting
Richard Briffault, The Local School District in American Law, in Besieged: School Boards
and the Future of Education Politics 24, 40 (William G. Howell ed., 2005))), with Heise,
supra note 312, at 131–34 (noting a shift from local control to greater state control as states
and the federal government have imposed additional requirements on schooling).
315. See Heise, supra note 312, at 135–36.
316. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (uphold-
ing minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to
state and local governments).
317. See Thane Rehn, Note, RICO and the Commerce Clause: A Reconsideration of the
Scope of Federal Criminal Law, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1991, 1995–99 (2008) (describing Con-
gress’s use of the Commerce Clause to enact various kinds of criminal laws).
318. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
319. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530–32 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 562–63 (1995) (striking down the Gun-Free School Zones Act in part because Con-
gress failed to demonstrate that it substantially affected interstate commerce).
320. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Unbundling Federalism: Colorado’s Legalization of
Marijuana and Federalism’s Many Forms, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1067 (2014) (discussing the
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comes to requiring states to take action and administer a federal policy. To
be clear, the differences between the federal election statutes and these other
major federal laws do not suggest that the federal election statutes are un-
constitutional—that question has been answered.321 But these differences
help explain why states have been so resistant to comply with the statutes
and why they may be reluctant to comply with future Elections Clause legis-
lation: the statutes implicate materially different kinds of federalism rela-
tionships from the relationships implicated by most federal policies.
D. The Character of Election Law Federalism
As discussed in the previous Sections, the federal election statutes do
not impermissibly violate the prevailing federalism doctrines.322 Neverthe-
less, the federal-state-local relationships the statutes affect implicate state
sovereignty in interesting ways.323 What, then, is the character of election law
federalism?
Matthew Damschroder, an Ohio election administrator, wrote that
HAVA’s funding structure “unsettled” the federal-state-local balance of
power.324 HAVA’s funding structure gave the federal government leverage
over state and local governments, and state government leverage over local
governments.325 It also moved some decisions that had traditionally been
dealt with at the local level—such as selecting voting systems—to the
states.326 The “unsettling has also led to a realignment of federal, state, and
local power in election administration.”327
That realignment has not yet been fully realized. The statutes require
states to take a strong oversight role in relation to their local governments’
election administration, in a number of significant areas: registration
(NVRA, HAVA), voting systems (HAVA), and absentee ballots (UOCAVA).
The statutes require states to play a role—that of close monitor of elec-
tions—that, considering the extent to which states have delegated their elec-
tion administration responsibilities, they presumably do not want to play.
The statutes thus create a role mismatch for states. And states have not fully
accepted this realignment. As I set out in Part I, states attempt to evade their
federalism relationships implicated by federal drug policy and state marijuana legalization);
Patricia J. Zettler, Toward Coherent Federal Oversight of Medicine, 52 San Diego L. Rev. 427
(2015) (describing the federalism relationships inherent in the regulation of drugs and the
practice of medicine).
321. See supra notes 123–129 and accompanying text.
322. See supra Section II.B.
323. See Weiser, supra note 26, at 677 (“Relying on federal law to justify action not au-
thorized under state law, although not a ‘commandeering’ of state agency resources as defined
in United States v. New York, certainly implicates the integrity of state sovereignty.” (footnote
omitted)).
324. Damschroder, supra note 79, at 195, 199.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 200.
790 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:747
responsibility in various ways. They hide behind state law and local govern-
ments to avoid liability for noncompliance with the statutes. As a conse-
quence, noncompliance is widespread.
Some might argue that an alternate explanation for this noncompliance
is that the statutes pose an enforcement problem, not a federalism problem.
That is, stronger enforcement by the Department of Justice and private par-
ties might reduce noncompliance. But noncompliance with these statutes
clearly implicates federalism, for two reasons. First, state arguments in re-
sponse to litigation pursuant to these statutes sound in federalism. As I de-
scribed above, states regularly make anticommandeering and state
sovereignty arguments when they are sued.328 So states in litigation focus less
on whether they have violated the statute and more on whether the statute
applies to them at all. Even in 2014, over twenty years after the NVRA was
enacted, states continued to make these arguments.329 Second, widespread
noncompliance persists even after many years. The Department of Justice
and private parties have sued multiple states multiple times pursuant to
these statutes, and still states remain noncompliant. This persistent noncom-
pliance suggests that the statutes present something other than mere en-
forcement difficulties; they present unresolved federalism issues.
Others might argue that the federal election statutes do not implicate
federalism at all. Instead, the statutes demonstrate a form of managerial de-
centralization330: because the statutes do not grant any significant decision-
making powers to the states, and therefore confer no sovereignty, they do
not implicate federalism. Franita Tolson applies this argument specifically to
voting rights. She notes that the Elections Clause permits the federal govern-
ment to preempt states freely, therefore stripping states of their sovereignty
in the elections context.331
I see election law federalism not in these stark terms of federal versus
state sovereignty, but instead as a set of relationships between federal, state,
and local bodies that each possess significant functional—if not doctrinal—
power. As Heather Gerken notes, with or without sovereignty, “states can
use their policymaking power to challenge, thwart, even defy the national
majority.”332 This is true in the elections context; it is true for local govern-
ments as well.
These sometimes contentious relationships pose unanswered doctrinal
questions. One commentator observes that following the New Deal, much
328. See supra Section I.B.
329. See Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann’s Answer and Defenses to Plaintiffs’ Com-
plaint, supra note 189, at 14; Brief of Secretary of State Delbert Hosemann in Opposition to
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 190, at 33–34 (citing United States v. Mis-
souri, 535 F.3d 844, 849–51 (8th Cir. 2008)).
330. Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis,
41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 910–14 (1994) (describing the differences between federalism and
decentralization).
331. Tolson, supra note 4.
332. Gerken, supra note 203, at 9.
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state power comes from federal laws that give states the opportunity to regu-
late and administer federal law.333 Because federalism doctrine generally has
focused on the limits of Congress’s authority to harness state involvement in
federal law vis-à-vis the Spending Clause,334 “our doctrines of federalism
and statutory law are not tuned in to the ways in which states exercise their
sovereign powers in the modern federal statutory era.”335 But because Con-
gress’s Spending Clause authority does not constrain election legislation, the
federal election statutes exist in a similar doctrinal void. Although the fed-
eral election statutes are not particularly new, a surprising dearth of case law
exists to flesh out the role of the realignment described above. Perhaps be-
cause states are reluctant to engage in protracted litigation with the Depart-
ment of Justice when they are sued pursuant to one of these statutes,336 and
because it remains unclear whether UOCAVA or HAVA contain private
rights of action, courts have not yet had to answer a number of thorny doc-
trinal questions that the statutes raise.
First, can a state be required to enforce the federal election statutes
against its counties? The Missouri court said no: Missouri could not be re-
quired to enforce the NVRA against its local governments.337 Other courts
have disagreed.338 But most courts have ignored or sidestepped the issue.
They have found states noncompliant and issued orders requiring compli-
ance, without specifying how to achieve that compliance.339 Whether the
federal election statutes even create a cause of action for states to sue their
local governments therefore remains an open question.340
As I have previously discussed, requiring a state to use its executive pow-
ers to enforce federal law smells like commandeering.341 But the alternative is
even more bizarre. If a state cannot be required to enforce the federal elec-
tion statutes against its local governments, how can it be held responsible for
failing to comply with these statutes? Political means—that is, convincing
333. Gluck, supra note 26, at 1997.
334. Id. at 2011 (“[T]he Court has put almost all of its energy into one particular exercise
of state power within federal statutory schemes; the choice by states whether to participate in
Congress’s conditional spending programs in the first place.”).
335. Id. at 2010.
336. See U.S. Dep’t Just., supra note 96 (of the twenty-seven UOCAVA complaints that
the U.S. Department of Justice filed against states since 2000, only four were contested and
resolved by judgment of the court; the rest were resolved by entry of a consent decree settle-
ment). States may feel that the optics of fighting the Department of Justice on a voting rights
issue do not favor them, making settlement a more attractive option.
337. United States v. Missouri, 535 F.3d 844, 851 (8th Cir. 2008).
338. See, e.g., Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, 452 (6th Cir. 2008).
339. See, e.g., United States v. New York, No. 1:10–cv–1214 (GLS/RFT), 2012 WL 254263,
at *3–5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2012) (setting forth a specific timeline for compliance, including
compliance by local governments, but declining to state how the state defendant should force
local governments to comply).
340. Recent Supreme Court case law provides some reason to be skeptical that this Court
would find such an implied cause of action. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–88
(2001) (declining to find an implied cause of action in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act).
341. See supra Section II.B.1.
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local governments to comply—are unreliable. Another method might be to
require states to simply take control of the election administration responsi-
bility in question. Under UOCAVA, for example, this might entail a state’s
taking control over the task of transmitting absentee ballots to military and
overseas voters. Even that option could require the state to enact new laws
and might be infeasible as a practical or political matter. Furthermore, the
commandeering character of the enforcement requirement is borne of the
state’s decision to delegate its constitutionally mandated requirement to ad-
minister elections. And the federal government cannot be required to enact
laws that account for the quirks of each state’s election system. The Supreme
Court has said as much, in a number of contexts.342
Second, even if a state is responsible for enforcing the federal election
statutes against its local governments, what empowers it to do so? As a num-
ber of states have pointed out in litigation, the federal election statutes do
not provide a cause of action for states to sue their local governments.343
UOCAVA, for example, gives a cause of action only to the United States
attorney general.344 The NVRA provides a cause of action to the attorney
general or any “person who is aggrieved” by a violation of the NVRA.345
None of the statutes provide a cause of action for state officials to bring the
state’s own subdivisions into compliance.346
Scholars have wrestled with how federal law can interact with state law
without fully preempting it. Whether federal law can enlarge state power has
been acknowledged as an open question but not resolved by the Supreme
Court.347 According to one theory, a cooperative federalism regulatory pro-
gram may be able to justify or empower state agency implementation of a
federal law in a manner not specifically authorized under existing state
342. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960) (rejecting the idea that
states can evade the Constitution by cloaking their actions “in the garb of the realignment of
political subdivisions”).
343. See, e.g., United States v. Missouri, 535 F.3d 844, 851 (8th Cir. 2008) (“The plain
language of the NVRA provides a right of enforcement to only two categories of plaintiffs—
the United States and ‘[a] person who is aggrieved by a violation of [the NVRA].’ ” (alterations
in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b)(1) (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C.
§ 20510(b)(1)))).
344. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-4(a) (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20307(a)).
345. Id. § 1973ff-9(a)–(b) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20510(a)–(b)).
346. One statutory option that might make a cause of action available to states is the All
Writs Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012). The All Writs Act empowers federal courts to “issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law.” Id. It is a rarely used statute, but it has been successfully used in
HAVA litigation to force a New York county to accept delivery of HAVA-compliant voting
machines. See Letter Brief of the United States, supra note 198, at 4–6 (successfully arguing
that New York was capable of asking the court to use its power under the All Writs Act to force
Nassau County into compliance with HAVA and the court’s remedial order in the case).
347. See Va. Office for Protection & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1641 n.7 (2011)
(raising the question but declining to address it).
March 2016] Election Law Federalism 793
law.348 Others have suggested that federal law can free state officials and local
government from the shackles of state law.349 Similarly here, do the federal
election statutes empower state officials to enforce the statutes against their
counties, either by conferring federal power upon them to do so, or by liber-
ating state officials from the constraints of state law?
Ultimately, given Congress’s broad powers under the Elections Clause,
and the Elections Clause’s insulation from traditional federalism doctrines,
we should understand the federal election statutes as requiring a role re-
alignment and providing the tools necessary for that realignment: a require-
ment that states enforce the statutes against their subdivisions and an
implicit cause of action making that enforcement possible. The alternative is
a bizarre reading whereby states may evade federal law by reorganizing their
internal structures.
Even better, however, would be for the statutes to acknowledge the role
realignment they create and explicitly provide the tools to make that realign-
ment effective. The next Part discusses how election legislation can do just
that.
III. Legislating an Election System with Multiple Sovereigns
All three levels of government—federal, state, and local—have a stake in
administering elections. And unlike many of the public policies described
above, where the federal government must thread the needle between en-
couraging state compliance and avoiding judicial interference, the federal
government need not thread that needle in the elections context. Instead, I
argue that the most effective enforcement of the federal election statutes
depends on finding the best blend of federal, state, and local involvement in
enforcing the statutes.350 In this Part, I propose such a blend and consider
how it might apply to voting challenges of the present and future.
A. Balancing Federal, State, and Local Involvement
The federal election statutes provide a model for strengthening the right
to vote by placing administration-based obligations on states. Regulating
election law in that way has the benefit of requiring the federal government
348. Gluck, supra note 26, at 2037 (“Can Congress, Through National Federalism Statutes,
Give State Actors Powers They Do Not Have Under State Law?”); Weiser, supra note 26, at 674.
349. Davidson, supra note 276, at 995; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use
of Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 Mich. L.
Rev. 1201, 1225–26 (1999); Laurie Reynolds, A Role for Local Government Law in Federal-
State-Local Disputes, 43 Urb. Law. 977, 980 (2011); Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Consti-
tutional Duels: Separation of Powers and State Implementation of Federal Inspired Regulatory
Programs and Standards, 46 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1343, 1354–63 (2005).
350. See Ewald, supra note 27, at 3 & n.11 (noting that most election policies implicate a
blend of federal, state, and local participation, but also observing that it is “surprisingly diffi-
cult to specify exactly which level of government bears legal and practical authority for varying
aspects of election management”).
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to enforce the laws only against the fifty states (and the District of Colum-
bia), rather than against the thousands of local governments that play a role
in election administration.
But as described above, statutes that take this form suffer from compli-
ance and enforcement problems, in part because they run up against tradi-
tional federalism norms. The statutes require role realignment for states, but
they do not explicitly set out how that realignment should occur.
Election laws that take the form of the federal election statutes can avoid
these problems and address the realities of a highly decentralized elections
system by explicitly stating the roles of each of the governmental actors in
the system. These statutes should (1) promote federal oversight of the entire
compliance process; (2) promote state management of the decentralized
compliance process specific to that state; and (3) promote local tailoring of
the statutes to local communities.
1. Promoting Federal Oversight
Federal election laws can promote federal oversight by providing more
comprehensive and reliable tools for the federal government to evaluate
noncompliance. The attorney general has statutorily mandated power to en-
force the federal election statutes.351 The statutes permit some private en-
forcement as well: the NVRA permits private parties to sue for violations of
the statutes;352 whether HAVA and UOCAVA provide private rights of action
is less clear.353 But the statutes provide few formal mechanisms for evaluat-
ing compliance. Data on statewide compliance with the Voting Rights Act is
infrequent and inconsistent.354
For example, the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) surveys states
every two years on their compliance with the NVRA.355 The EAC data may
be used to gauge NVRA compliance, but it is unreliable and incomplete. In
the most recent EAC NVRA report, over twenty states are missing compli-
ance numbers.356 Heather Gerken similarly estimates that in the mid-2000s,
only 60 percent of states submitted more than half of the information EAC
351. 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-4(a) (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20307(a)) (UOCAVA); 42
U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(a) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20510(a)) (NVRA); 42 U.S.C. § 15511 (recodi-
fied at 52 U.S.C. § 21111) (HAVA).
352. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9(b) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20510(b)).
353. See Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action, supra note 3, at 142–46 (discuss-
ing UOCAVA); id. at 147–54 (discussing HAVA). Scholars have called for more generous rights
of action for those statutes. See generally id.
354. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, The Future of Election Reform: From Rules to Institutions, 28
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 125, 146–49 (2009) (warning about the dangers of federal oversight of
election regulations because of weak federal administrative enforcement mechanisms).
355. NVRA Studies, U.S. Elections Assistance Comm’n, http://www.eac.gov/registra
tion-data/ [https://perma.cc/VAV8-PNHY].
356. U.S. Elections Assistance Comm’n, The 2014 EAC Election Administration
and Voting Survey Comprehensive Report 81 (2015), http://www.eac.gov/assets/1/Docu
ments/2014%20EAC%20EAVS%20Report.pdf [https://perma/cc/239S-DMSF]. In 2011–2012,
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requested of them.357 Without reliable data on compliance, the federal gov-
ernment (and private parties seeking compliance) must conduct burden-
some investigations into compliance at the local level based on citizen
complaints. A lack of reliable compliance data therefore eliminates the effi-
ciency gains of placing the burden of compliance onto states, rather than
local governments, because it forces the federal government to investigate
local noncompliance anyway.
Because of inconsistent and unreliable compliance reporting, states
themselves often do not even know whether they are complying with the
statutes. Some states permit state officials to require compliance reporting
from local voter registration agencies,358 but some state officials have stated
in litigation that they do not have the authority to force their local govern-
ments to report on compliance.359 A Pew Charitable Trusts report on the
NVRA’s motor vehicle requirements360 found that “almost none of the states
covered by the law [can] document the degree to which their motor vehicle
agencies are offering citizens the opportunity to register to vote or update
their registrations.”361 California, for example, requires its county elections
offices to report compliance data on whether DMVs are offering voter regis-
tration opportunities. However, the California secretary of state’s office re-
ports that many county databases do not record the information necessary
to monitor compliance. As a result, the compliance data California is able to
report is necessarily inaccurate.362
Congress should place strict reporting requirements on both state and
local levels of government. Doing so would accomplish at least two goals.
First, it would prevent states from fully abdicating their role as actors re-
sponsible for complying with the statutes. Forcing states to collect compre-
hensive compliance data from their local governments will force states to at
least confront and acknowledge evidence of noncompliance. Publicizing
elections data can motivate states and local governments to improve their
election administration, even without the threat of lawsuit.363 Second, re-
quiring states to produce compliance data would give the federal govern-
ment (and private parties seeking compliance) both the tools to determine
data was missing from over half of the states. United States Elections Assistance Commis-
sion, The Impact of the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 on the Administra-
tion of Elections for Federal Office 2011–2012 46–47 (2013), http://www.eac.gov/assets/
1/Documents/EAC_NVRA%20Report_lowres.pdf [http://perma.cc/2UW7-D7AH].
357. Gerken, supra note 29, at 44–49 (describing the poor response rate to the EAC’s
surveys and the minimal availability of election administration data more broadly).
358. California is one such state. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12172.5 (2011).
359. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, supra note 164, at 5 n.2.
360. For example, that motor vehicle offices treat driver’s license applications as voter
registration applications. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-3 (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20504).
361. Pew Charitable Trusts, supra note 90, at 2.
362. Id. at 2–3.
363. Gerken, supra note 29, at 67–92 (describing political and policy reasons why collect-
ing and publicizing better election data could be an effective tool for improving election
administration).
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whether litigation is necessary and reliable evidence of noncompliance. Since
reliable compliance data would also be admissible in court, it could decrease
litigation time and costs.
2. Promoting State Management
Congress can promote state management by empowering states to take a
more active hand in administering elections. As described above,364 most
states do not actually administer elections. Instead, states delegate much of
their constitutional role as elections administrators to local governments.
Congress should account for and accommodate the reality of the highly de-
centralized and diverse system of election administration while continuing
to hold states ultimately liable for compliance with the statutes.365
Congress can encourage state management in three ways. First, in future
election legislation, Congress can include language clarifying that state offi-
cials are ultimately liable for noncompliance despite any delegation under
state law to local governments. This language, although perhaps unnecessary
as a legal matter, would avoid confusion and litigation over the question of
which governmental body is ultimately responsible for compliance.
The Food Stamp Act and the Medicaid Act provide helpful models. The
Food Stamp Act accounts for a decentralized system of public assistance ad-
ministration by including an expansive definition of “state agency.” It de-
fines “state agency” as “the agency of State government, including the local
offices thereof, which has the responsibility for the administration of the fed-
erally aided public assistance programs within such State.”366 Furthermore,
“in those States where such assistance programs are operated on a decentral-
ized basis, the term [state agency] shall include the counterpart local agen-
cies administering such programs.”367 Medicaid does even more by requiring
that states that delegate administration responsibility to local governments
closely monitor that delegation.368 Medicaid regulations permit the state
agency responsible for administering Medicaid to delegate eligibility deter-
minations to local government agencies.369 Should the state delegate, how-
ever, it must also create “methods to keep itself . . . informed of the
364. See supra Subsection II.A.2.
365. A number of scholars advocate for federal law that accounts for decentralization and
argue that accommodating states in that way both respects state sovereignty and can lead to
greater compliance with the federal law. Annie Decker, Preemption Conflation: Dividing the
Local from the State in Congressional Decision Making, 30 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 321 (2012); see
also Reynolds, supra note 349.
366. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(t) (2012) (renumbered as § 2012(s) by Agricultural Act of 2014,
Pub. L. 113-79, § 4030(3)–(4), 128 Stat. 649, 813 (2014)) (emphasis added).
367. Id.
368. Shakhnes v. Berlin, 689 F.3d 244, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2012) (describing how Medicaid
allocates responsibility between federal, state, and local governments).
369. See 42 C.F.R. § 431.10(d) (2014).
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adherence of local agencies to the State plan provisions” and “[t]ake correc-
tive action to ensure their adherence.”370
Second, Congress should create a federal cause of action available to
states to sue their subdivisions to bring them into compliance with federal
law, in case state law does not provide such a mechanism.371 As discussed
above, whether the federal election statutes actually provide an implicit
cause of action to states remains an open question.372 But strengthening state
management of local governments is doubly important after Shelby County.
Shelby County significantly weakened federal oversight of local governments
by disabling section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. With section 5 gone, the
federal government now has an interest in strengthening the state-local rela-
tionship so that some centralized body has oversight of local governments. A
federal cause of action that would give states leverage over their local gov-
ernments could centralize the elections system and avoid the kind of local
misconduct that justified section 5 in the first place.373
Finally, Congress should impose sanctions for noncompliance. As they
currently stand, the federal election statutes permit the attorney general to
seek declaratory and injunctive relief,374 but the statutes impose no punish-
ments on states or local governments, monetary or otherwise, for noncom-
pliance. Without monetary relief, the federal election statutes have little bite.
My proposed blend of federal, state, and local involvement in enforcing
the federal election statutes falls heaviest on states. This imbalance is as it
should be. States are constitutionally responsible for administering elections;
federal election law should operate to encourage and empower that
responsibility.
3. Promoting Local Tailoring
Federal election law can more successfully engage citizens in the voting
process by promoting local tailoring.375 One difficulty regulating elections at
370. Id. § 435.903.
371. Although outside the contexts of elections and state-local relationships, Margaret Le-
mos writes about the benefits of state actors enforcing federal laws when those laws provide
causes of action. See Lemos, supra note 302.
372. See supra notes 343–349 and accompanying text.
373. In theory, a party could move to join a local government in a lawsuit against a state
for violating a federal election statute, thereby bringing the offending local government under
the jurisdiction of the court. The Department of Justice has resisted that solution, however,
and argued instead that joinder is unnecessary. See Letter Brief, United States v. N.Y. State Bd.
of Elections, 312 F. App’x 353 (2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-4221-cv), 2008 WL 5707384.
374. 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-4(a) (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20307(a)) (UOCAVA); id.
§ 1973gg-9(a) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. 20510(a)) (NVRA); id. §1511 (recodified at 52 U.S.C.
§ 21111) (HAVA).
375. Much of the academic literature on local governments focuses on the potential of
local governments to reflect and accommodate the diversity of their residents more so than
states and the federal government. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Norma-
tive and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1303, 1348–49 (1994)
(contrasting the comparative advantages of state and local governments); cf. Gerken, supra
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the federal level is that election jurisdictions differ significantly.376 Whereas
some jurisdictions are miniscule—a small county in Montana might have a
population of about a thousand people (and even fewer people of voting
age)377—a large metropolitan area will serve millions—Los Angeles County,
for example, houses ten million people.378 These differences give rise to what
the Presidential Commission on Election Administration refers to as a “one
size does not fit all” problem.379 For this reason, local governments can tailor
some parts of the elections process to the needs of their communities.
For example, election legislation can encourage modest local tailoring
by permitting states some flexibility in how they enforce the statutes. The
NVRA, for example, requires states to designate, as voter registration agen-
cies, not only public assistance and state disability offices, but “other offices
within the State,” which may include libraries, schools, or fishing and hunt-
ing license bureaus.380 Local governments are perfectly situated to determine
which local offices are best suited to house additional voter registration
opportunities.
Or consider a new federal law that imposes poll worker training require-
ments. The law could permit local governments to create training materials
appropriate for the jurisdiction, with state oversight. Similarly, a federal law
that mandates maximum polling place waiting times could empower local
governments to decide—preliminarily and again with state oversight—how
to allocate poll workers and voting systems to best meet the needs of their
communities. Election legislation can include small provisions like these that
permit state and local governments to tailor the election administration pro-
cess to specific communities.
note 203, at 10 (arguing that decentralization can promote minority rights by giving commu-
nities that may not own a national or statewide majority of the electorate a voice in the juris-
diction where they do comprise a majority of the electorate).
376. David C. Kimball & Brady Baybeck, Are All Jurisdictions Equal? Size Disparity in Elec-
tion Administration, 12 Election L.J. 130, 130 (2013) (noting the “tremendous disparities in
local election administration”).
377. Montana County Population Projections - County Comparisons, 1990-2060
(2013), http://ceic.mt.gov/Documents/PopulationProjections/EMRI/StateTotals/eREMI_MT
_CountyComparisons_TotalPopulation_April2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/9TAM-C2XD] (Carter
County, Montana, had 1,335 residents in 2010).
378. United States Census Bureau, Los Angeles County, California (2010), http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06/06037.html [http://perma.cc/D56B-7LQG] (Los Angeles
County had a population of 9,818,610 in 2010).
379. American Voting Experience, supra note 21, at 9 (“Given the complexity and vari-
ation in local election administration, the argument goes, no set of practices can be considered
‘best’ for every jurisdiction. Some reforms that work well in certain contexts will be unneces-
sary or fail in others. There is certainly merit to this position; no one can doubt the limits of
nationwide reforms of the American electoral system when local institutions, rules, and cul-
tures differ considerably.”).
380. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-5(a)(3)(A) (2012) (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(3)(A)).
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B. Election Law Federalism Today and Tomorrow
Although this Article has focused on three particular statutes—the
NVRA, HAVA, and UOCAVA—the idea of election law federalism has a
broader application within election law. As described above,381 Congress
may be forced to turn to race-neutral election administration legislation to
fortify the right to vote as the Supreme Court becomes more hostile to an-
tidiscrimination legislation. Any federal law that regulates a feature of elec-
tion administration that states delegate to local governments—which
includes most of the elections process—implicates the promise and pitfalls
of election law federalism.
Consider, for example, the report of the Presidential Commission,
which issued a number of administration-based proposals for election re-
form. The commission suggested standards for poll worker training and
procedures for determining the location of polling places.382 Although the
commission did not frame its recommendations in the form of proposed
federal law, it provided examples of legislation that could easily be translated
into federal law.
Or consider two election laws that Hillary Rodham Clinton proposed
during her campaign for president in 2015. First, Clinton proposed that all
adults be automatically registered to vote unless they opt out.383 Second, she
proposed that all states provide twenty days of early voting before
elections.384
These policies implicate the lessons of election law federalism. In each of
the proposals described above, the federal government would impose re-
quirements on states for administration responsibilities: poll worker train-
ing, voter registration, early voting. As discussed above, these responsibilities
are largely administered by local governments.385 The same liability mis-
match could plague these policies and potentially pose compliance chal-
lenges. The suggestions above—including strict reporting requirements,
creation of a federal cause of action for states to use against local govern-
ments, sanctions, and opportunities for local tailoring—would increase the
effectiveness of the laws.
Election law federalism bears not only on contemporary issues in elec-
tion law, but on future issues as well. Voting is on its way to becoming a
predominantly remote activity. In California, for instance, absentee ballots
comprised 4.7 percent of the ballots cast in 1978. In 2002, 26 percent of
381. See supra Section I.A.5.
382. American Voting Experience, supra note 21, at 31–54.
383. Revitalizing Our Democracy, Hillary for America, https://www.hillaryclinton.com/
the-four-fights/revitalizing-our-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/QZ9F-BCMH].
384. Id.
385. See supra Section II.A.2.
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ballots were cast absentee. In 2012, it was 65 percent.386 Oregon and Wash-
ington conduct elections largely by mail.387 As described above, many states
have delegated absentee ballot transmittal to local governments. Federal leg-
islation that regulates absentee ballots—for example, a federal law that re-
quires states to transmit absentee ballots a certain amount of time before an
election, or a law that standardizes the absentee ballot and envelope for-
mat—might be administered by local governments. As with the proposals
above, these statutes would face the challenges and opportunities of election
law federalism.
Conclusion
Elections are our chaotic symphonies of democracy. They draw from
the law of all levels of government. Sometimes those laws are at odds, and
federal-state-local discord can result in noncompliance with federal law.
Federal election legislation like the NVRA, UOCAVA, and HAVA, which all
seek to standardize aspects of the elections process, suffers from noncompli-
ance in part because the statutes ask states to assume administrative respon-
sibilities that states have delegated to local governments. These statutes do
not violate federalism principles, but they run in tension with those princi-
ples, which causes difficulty and delay during enforcement litigation. We
must fully understand these challenges as we turn to other election adminis-
tration-based statutes to fortify and federalize the right to vote. These stat-
utes are no substitute for antidiscrimination laws like the Voting Rights Act,
but as the Supreme Court (and possibly Congress itself) becomes more hos-
tile to race-based antidiscrimination legislation, these statutes offer a way
forward that may be more politically palatable and legally secure.
This Article has suggested a new way of thinking about federal election
legislation that seeks to regulate and standardize the electoral process. It has
argued that federal election legislation should account for the multiple sov-
ereigns and complicated legal relationships that affect the elections process.
Legislation can accomplish those ends by providing the federal government
with stronger oversight tools; by empowering states to manage their local
governments; and by allowing local governments to modestly tailor the ad-
ministration of the law to their jurisdictions.
Election law can teach us a broader lesson about federal, state, and local
cooperation and conflict. Although election law is largely sui generis as both
a policy and a constitutional matter, it is not the only area of federal law that
suffers from enforcement challenges borne from state delegation to local
government. Consider public assistance administration, which states often
386. John Wildermuth, Increase in Early Voting Alters Election Landscape, S.F. Chron.
(May 4, 2014), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Increase-in-early-voting-alters-election-
landscape-5452706.php [http://perma.cc/4C5G-NHFC].
387. Absentee and Early Voting, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures (Feb. 11,
2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx
[http://perma.cc/V32N-KWWW].
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delegate to their local governments.388 In 1992, public assistance recipients in
Virginia sued the commissioner of the Virginia Department of Social Ser-
vices for violations of the Food Stamp Act. The commissioner argued that he
could not be held responsible for any noncompliance caused by local public
assistance agencies. Although the Court was “not unsympathetic to the
Commissioner’s concern that his power is limited under state laws governing
the state social service system,” it held that “under federal law, the Commis-
sioner is . . . fully responsible for ensuring compliance.”389
These legal relationships raise complicated questions about the practi-
cal—if not doctrinal—limits of federal power in the face of state-local coop-
eration and conflict. Election law federalism provides a model and a starting
point for a broader understanding of federal power in a world of multiple
sovereigns.
388. See Robertson v. Jackson, 972 F.2d 529, 530 (4th Cir. 1992). For a fascinating histori-
cal account of local government as a roadblock to effective federal enforcement of the Social
Security Act, see Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language
of the State, 122 Yale L.J. 314, 346–55 (2012).
389. Robertson, 972 F.2d at 535. Incarceration provides another example. In California,
state prisons house detainees in county jails for a variety of reasons, including for in-house
drug treatment and parole-related prisoner transitions. See Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622
F.3d 1058, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2010). A class of detainees sued the governor of California for
violating their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and a number of other federal
laws. See id. at 1062. The governor disclaimed responsibility for ensuring that county jails
complied with those statutes. The governor made anticommandeering arguments, which the
Ninth Circuit rejected. See id. at 1068–69, 1074 (addressing anticommandeering arguments
and concluding that “defendants cannot shirk their obligations to plaintiffs under federal law
by housing them in facilities operated by the third-party counties”). Just three years later,
California made the same argument: that it could not be held responsible for county jail
conditions as applied to state prisoners who were transferred to county jails because of over-
crowding. California argued that to hold it responsible “would interfere with [its] prerogative
to structure its internal affairs.” See Armstrong v. Brown, 732 F.3d 955, 957–60 (9th Cir.
2013). Again, the Ninth Circuit disagreed. Id. at 962–63. The repeated nature of these argu-
ments, and the federalist nature of their contents, recall arguments made by the state defend-
ants in the federal election statutes cases. See supra notes 264–266 and accompanying text.
